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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN THE WORKPLACE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS OF WOMEN
LINDA G. HOWARD t
In recent years, awareness of the health risks from chemicals
in the workplace has increased dramatically.' The possibility that
occupational exposure to some chemicals can affect a worker's
ability to produce normal children has received particular atten-
tion.2 In response, many American companies have removed
women with childbearing capacity from their jobs and refused to
hire women with childbearing capacity.3 These employers assert
that their purpose is to protect women workers and their offspring
from birth defects, miscarriages, and stillbirths-all misfortunes that
may result from workplace exposure to hazardous chemicals.4
Employment policies that exclude women solely because they
may become pregnant are clear violations of the 1978 "pregnancy
amendment" to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,r which
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of pregnancy,
f Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. B.A. 1971, Reed College;
J.D. 1973, University of Virginia. Member, Virginia Bar.
' See generally H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Brody, Sperm Found Especially Vulnerable to Environment, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 1981, at C1, col. 5; Hricko, Social Policy Considerations of Occu-
pational Health Standards: The Example of Lead and Reproductive Effects, 7
P EENIVE MED. 398 (1978); Hyatt, Early Warning Protection for the Unborn?
Work Safety Issue Isn t As Simple As It Sounds, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1977, at 1,
col. 1; Trebilcock, OSHA and Equal Employment Opportunity Laws for Women,
7 PREVENTIVE MED. 372 (1978).
3 It is instructive to note that traditionally male-dominated industries have
demonstrated concern for pregnancy outcomes by excluding fertile women. Com-
panies that require proof from female applicants and employees of inability to bear
children include American Cyanamid Company, Dow Chemical Company, General
Motors Corporation (Delco-Remy Division), Monsanto, Firestone, B.F. Goodrich,
and St. Joe Minerals Corporation. Hricko, supra note 2, at 398-99. Exclusionary
policies have not been adopted by American employers in female-dominated in-
dustries, such as agriculture and textiles, in which substantial numbers of female
workers are exposed to similarly hazardous substances, including pesticides and
certain hydrocarbons. See note 40 infra & accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320, 321 (N.D. Ohio
1979).
542 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. MI 1979).
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childbirth, or related medical conditions.8 Some policies may also
violate the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 7 (OSH
Act), which mandates a safe and healthful work environment for
all employees. 8 Neither the OSH Act nor title VII, however, satis-
factorily resolves the question when, if ever, an employer may
exclude employees who are endangered by the work environment.
In an attempt to address the issue, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) jointly issued "Proposed Inter-
pretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Hazardous
Substances," 9 but withdrew them in early 1981.10 The failure of
I See notes 88-97 infra & accompanying text.
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976, Supp. I 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
8 See notes 44-66 infra & accompanying text.
945 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980), corrected in 45 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Guidelines].
The proposed guidelines were prompted by the discovery that several em-
ployers had adopted the practice of excluding pregnant and fertile women from
employment in apparent violation of the newly enacted "pregnancy amendment"
to title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (Supp. M 1979). 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980).
The EEOC recognized that the real issue was much broader than the employment
rights of fertile or pregnant women. The ultimate question was whether the em-
ployer had fulfilled its duty to maintain a safe working environment for all of its
workers. In an admirable and relatively unusual spirit of inter-agency cooperation,
the EEOC, OSHA, and OFCCP embarked upon a joint project to resolve the
problem.
Neither an application of current law nor a proposal for change, the guidelines
are best described as a road map designed to lead the federal courts through the
relevant issues to an accommodating modification in title VII law. Thus, though
they have now been withdrawn, see note 10 infra, the guidelines are worthy of
careful consideration. See notes 204, 213 & 217-18 infra.
The guidelines proposed consideration of at least nine factors in determining
whether an employer's exclusionary policy was nondiscriminatory or justified:
(1) whether the policy has been applied consistently to both sexes; (2) whether
the employer has complied with applicable occupational safety and health laws;
(3) whether the employer has investigated the effects of all scientifically recognized
reproductive hazards in the workplace on those adversely affected and those not
similarly affected; (4) whether the hazard is significantly greater for or confined
to the excluded group; (5) whether the employer has a pattern of discrimination
against the excluded group; (6) whether the policy is narrowly tailored to the
type of hazard posed; (7) whether there is no evidence that the hazard poses a
significant health risk to body systems other than the reproductive system for the
class not excluded; (8) whether the employer has investigated alternatives to
exclusion, and (9) whether the employer is monitoring scientific developments.
45 Fed. Reg. at 7515.
The proposal offered in this Article differs from the guidelines both in style
and substance. In most applications, however, the proposal is consistent with the
EEOC's guidelines.
10 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981):
Extensive comments were received. Upon reviewing the comments, the
agencies have concluded that the most appropriate method of eliminating
employment discrimination in the work place where there is potential
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this initial administrative attempt to solve the problem of fetal
health in the workplace 11 leaves the federal courts with no clear
guidance as to how to treat discrimination based on childbearing
age or capacity under title VII.
The paramount problem is that, while under existing title
VII law an employer may not exclude a woman from employment
because she has childbearing capacity or is of childbearing age, in
some circumstances exclusion may be the only feasible means to
protect fetal health. 12 A significant underlying problem is that fetal
injury from occupational exposure to hazardous substances is gen-
erally associated with exposure of women workers, although there
is substantial evidence that males are also affected by reproduc-
tively toxic chemicals. 13
The issues are easily resolved in cases in which employers are
able to protect workers from reproductive injury without excluding
susceptible employees, or when the OSH Act imposes a duty to
remove the hazard from the workplace rather than remove the
employee. That Act requires the employer to provide a safe work-
place only if it is "feasible" for the employer's industry to do so.' 4
exposure to reproductive hazards is through investigation and enforcement
of the law on a case by case basis, rather than by the issuance of
interpretive guidelines.
"Judicial and quasi-judicial attempts at resolving this question have been no
more fruitful. After several women employees of American Cyanamid Company
underwent sterilization in order to keep their jobs in the company's lead pigments
division, OSHA issued a citation challenging their employer's "fetus protection
policy." The employer sought review before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission. See note 57 infra. The challenge was dismissed on the
employer's motion for summary judgment. Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid
Co., OSHRC Docket No. 79-5762 (July 15, 1980), discussed further at text accom-
panying notes 241-54 infra. Litigation in this case is also pending in the federal
courts. See Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 80-0024-P (N.D. W. Va.,
filed May 20, 1980).
The similar policy adopted by B.F. Goodrich has sustained attack in the
federal courts. In Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio
1979), the district court denied a request for a preliminary injunction brought by
a female employee who was excluded from working in the company's vinyl chloride
polymerization plant. The employer did not, however, terminate her completely;
rather, she was transferred to a lower level position without loss of pay. Id. 321,
325. This was enough to permit the court to sidestep the issue whether the
employer's policy survived scrutiny under title VII by deciding that the plaintiff
had not demonstrated irreparable injury. See id. 323. The court stated in
dictum, however, that it considered the plaintiff unlikely to succeed on the merits.
Id. 326.
12 See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
13 See text accompanying notes 23, 32-34 & 39 infra.
'4 See note 47 infra.
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When other nondiscriminatory protective measures are not feasible,
however, the interests in fetal health and the worker's right to be
free from discrimination on the basis of sex are in conflict.
The potential for fetal harm from workplace chemicals im-
poses hard choices among competing societal interests. The im-
portant societal interest in the worker's reproductive health, the
national policy of equal employment opportunity, and the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in business profitability all must be
considered. The purpose of this Article is to analyze the issues
raised by exclusionary employment policies, to define the duties
imposed under title VII and the OSH Act on the employer who
seeks to protect the unborn from the hazards of workplace toxins,
and to propose a workable resolution of the conflict between the
health of the unborn and the employment rights of working
women15
The analysis begins in part I with a description of the chemicals
and the industries involved and a summary of the medical data
establishing the health risks of occupational exposure to workplace
toxins, particularly reproductive risks. Part II outlines the scope
of the legal issues and develops the policies served by the OSH
Act. Part III analyzes title VII's prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation and applies tide VII to policies that exclude on the basis
of childbearing age and capacity. The existing tide VII defenses
are then analyzed and applied as the final step in determining the
lawfulness of exclusion on the basis of childbearing age or capacity.
Part IV discusses the problems inherent in current title VII analysis,
and demonstrates the need for reform. Part V proposes changing
tide VII law through judicial interpretation to permit the em-
ployer to exclude susceptible workers in the limited circumstances
in which exclusion is necessary to protect fetal health. The Article
concludes that a modification in tide VII law through the judicial
process, rather than legislative amendment, is the best solution to
the problem of discriminatory practices resulting from occupational
exposure to hazardous substances.
i5 For other scholarly discussions and attempts to resolve this problem, see
Finneran, Title VII and Restrictions on Employment of Fertile Women, 31 LAB.
L.J. 223 (1980); Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments:
The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 66 IowA L. Rxv. 63 (1980); Comment, Employment Rights of
Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1113 (1977) thereinafter
cited as CA. Comment]; Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices in Hazardous
Industries: Protection or Discrimination?, 5 CoLtrm. J. ENV'iL L. 97 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Cormr. Note]; Note, Birth Defects Caused by Parental
Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort
Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237 (1979) [hereinafter cited as M.cm Note].
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I. HEALTH EFFECTS OF Toxic SUBSTANCES ON THE
HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM
When the employer excludes fertile women from employment
because of the possible adverse health effects of toxic substances in
the workplace, consideration of the toxin's effects on the general
health and reproductive processes of both male and female workers
will in large part dictate whether the policy violates title VII.
Clearly, if the substance harms both men and women (or their off-
spring), any policy that excludes only women discriminates on the
basis of sex. An examination of the available scientific data-and,
perhaps even more important, an appreciation for the glaring de-
ficiencies in the available data-is, therefore, the first step in resolv-
ing the issue.
Although the precise manner in which many chemicals affect
the workers' reproductive systems is unknown,16 medical researchers
have established relationships between occupational exposure to
certain chemicals and observable physiological symptoms. A short
discussion of these relationships is in order.'1 Toxic substances may
harm the fetus either indirectly, by altering the parent's reproduc-
tive system, or directly, by attacking the embryo or fetus itself.
Gametotoxins cause malformations of the egg or sperm prior to
conception.' Mutagens alter the chromosomal structure of the
parental germ plasm.'9 Teratogens operate directly on the develop-
ing embryo or fetus.20 A given substance may have gametotoxic,
mutagenic, and teratogenic effects depending upon both the nature
of the substance and the level of exposure.
'0 Most chemicals have not been tested for their effects on human repro-
duction. J. SamLmri , WoMmN's WoPn, WoNms HETHw: Myis AN
RE.iniEs 156 (1977). The Chemical Abstract Service listed over 4 million
distinct chemical entities as of November 1977, of which 33,000 are in common
use. Maugh, Chemicals: How Many Are There? 199 SmENcE 162 (1978). For
a discussion of methodology and a summary of clinical findings, see Manson,
Human and Laboratory Animal Test Systems Available for Detection of Repro-
ductive Failure, 7 PnEvrNnvs MED. 322, 325-27 (1978).
1'7 For a more complete summary of this subject, see Furnish, supra note 15,
at 119-29.
18 CALw. Comment, supra note 15, at 1116.
19Id. See Strobino, Kline & Stein, Chemical and Physical Exposures of
Parents: Effects on Human Reproduction and Offspring, 1 EAmLY HuMAN DEV.
371, 375 (1978).
2oCzn . Comment, supra note 15, at 1116 & n.13. See Manson, supra note
16, at 325-29.
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A. Lead
Lead is one of the few toxins whose harmful effects to employees
are well-documented. 21 Occupational exposure to lead can impair
the respiratory, cardiovascular, renal, and reproductive systems.
It is important to note that, even in the reproductive area, lead
harms both male and female workers. In males, there is evidence
of decreased sexual drive, impotence, sterility, and decreased ability
to produce normal sperm,2 3 which leads to abnormal pregnancies
in their mates.&2 4 Occupational exposure of females to lead can
cause sterility, abnormal ovarian cycles, menstrual disorders, pre-
mature birth, miscarriage, and stillbirth.25
The ability of lead to damage the developing embryo or fetus
suggests that lead acts as a teratogen. Exposure of mothers to
high concentrations of lead during pregnancy has been linked with
mental retardation 2 7 and neurological disorders 2  in their off-
spring. The substance is also suspected of having mutagenic and
gametotoxic effects. 29
B. Vinyl Chloride and Chloroprene
Workers exposed to vinyl chloride and its sister chemical,
chloroprene, used in the manufacture of vinyls, plastics, and syn-
21 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1980) (OSHA lead standards); 43 Fed. Beg.
52,954-63 (1978); Furnish, supra note 15, at 70-74.
2 2 See 43 Fed. Reg. 52,954-63 (1978); Bridbord, Occupational Lead Ex-
posure and Women, 7 PvunNTrvE MED. 311 (1978). See generally Cow =rr
ON nT T Hum x ENvmoNmr~ur, NATIONAL BESEAECH CoUNcIL, LEAD
IN 7H HumAN ENVIRONMENT (1980) [hereinafter cited as LEAD N mw HUMAN
ENmRONmENT].
2 3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025, app. A (1980) (substance data sheet for over-
exposure to lead); 43 Fed. Reg. 52,959 (1978); LEAD IN mus Hui&Ax ENVmoN-
mENT, supra note 22, at 7; A. Hmicxo & M. BRuNT, WORINC iron Yout Lum A
WOMAN's GuiE TO Jon HEALTH HAZARS C-6 (1976).
2429 C.F.R. § 1910.1025, app. A (1980); Infante & Wagoner, The Effects of
Lead on Reproduction, in SOCIE-Y FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND) ENVmONMENTAL
HEALTH, PRoCEEDINGs, CONFERECE ON WoAMN AND mu WoRKPLAcE 232-43
(1977) [hereinafter cited as SOEH CoNrEaEucE]; Bon, Effects of Lead on the
Female and Reproduction: A Review, 43 MT. SiNAI J. MEn. 542, 546 (1976).
2z29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025, app. A (1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 52,959 (1978);
LEAD IN mu HmvM ENvimoNMENT, supra note 22, at 7; A. Hmcxo & M. BRuNT,
.supra note 23, at C-7, C-8.
2 0 Bridbord, supra note 22, at 313.
27 Id. 317; Timpo, Amin, Casalino & Yuceoglu, Congenital Lead Intoxication,
94 J. Pa n rncs 765, 766 (1979).
2 8 Rom, supra note 24, at 545; Timpo, Amin, Casalino & Yuceoglu, supra
note 27, at 766.
29 See 43 Fed. Reg. 52,959 (1978); Hricko, supre note 2, at 396; CAIF.
Comment, supra note 15, at 1120 n.25.
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thetic rubbers, risk severe impairment to their health in general 30
and to their reproductive systems in particular.31 Wives of male
workers occupationally exposed to vinyl chloride experience a sig-
nificantly higher than normal rate of fetal deaths.32 Abnormal num-
bers of chromosomal aberrations in males who work with vinyl
chloride lead medical experts to conclude that occupational expo-
sure causes germ cell damage in the father.3 Children of male
vinyl chloride workers and even children born in communities near
vinyl chloride processing facilities have an increased incidence of
congenital birth defects.34
Chloroprene, a chemical compound structurally similar to
vinyl chloride, is used widely in the chemical industry to produce
the rubber substitute, polychloroprene. Studies reveal that males
occupationally exposed to chloroprene suffer decreased motility of
sperm.35  Other studies report that wives of workers exposed to
chloroprene suffered three times the expected number of miscar-
20 See generally Anderson, Snyder, Lewinson, Woo, Lilis & Selikoff, Levels of
CEA Among Vinyl Chloride and Polyvinyl Chloride Exposed Workers, 42 CANcan
1560 (1978); Wagoner, Infante & Brown, Genetic Effects Associated with Industrial
Chemicals, in SOEH CONFmmNCE, supra note 24, at 100; Waxweiler, Stringer,
Wagoner, Jones, Falk & Carter, Neoplastic Risk among Workers Exposed to Vinyl
Chloride, 271 ANNALS N.Y. Actt. Scr. 40 (1976).
OSHA promulgated standards regulating workplace exposure to vinyl chloride,
see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1980), after the first reported deaths of vinyl chloride
workers in 1972. See Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301,
1305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). The court upheld the validity
of the standards in the face of industry attack. Id. 1310-11.
A recent study indicates that "reduction in exposure to vinyl chloride is
accompanied by a reduction in the chromosomal abnormalities to levels indis-
tinguishable from those of controls." Anderson, Richardson, Weight, Purchase &
Adams, Chromosomal Analyses in Vinyl Chloride Exposed Workers, 79 MuTATON
REsEARcH 151, 151 (1980).
31See Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320, 326 n.4 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (discussing briefly the state of medical evidence concerning the relative risks
of birth defects induced by exposure to vinyl chloride among male and female
workers). See generally Ducatman, Hirschhorn & Selikoff, Vinyl Chloride Ex-
posure and Human Chromosome Aberrations, 31 MUTATION REsEAncH 163 (1975);
Infante, McMichael, Wagoner, Waxweiler & Falk, Genetic Risks of Vinyl Chloride,
1 LANCET 734 (1976); Manson, supra note 16, at 322; Wagoner, Infante & Brown,
supra note 30, at 101-02.
32
lnfante, McMichael, Wagoner, Waxweiler & Falk, supra note 31, at 734-35;
Wagoner, Infante & Brown, supra note 30, at 101.
32 Infante, McMichael, Wagoner, Waxweiler & Falk, supra note 31, at 735;
Infante, Wagoner & Waxweiler, Carcinogenic, Mutagenic and Teratogenic Risks
Associated with Vinyl Chloride, 41 MuTATioN REsEARcH 131, 140 (1976).
34 Infante, Oncogenic and Mutagenic Risks in Communities with Polyvinyl
Chloride Production Facilities, 271 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Scr. 49, 56 (1976);
Wagoner, Infante & Brown, supra note 30, at 101.
35 Infante, Mutagenic and Carcinogenic Risks Associated with Halogenated
OleJins, 21 ENVT'L HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 251, 251 (1977); Wagoner, Infante &
Brown, supra note 30, at 102.
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riages. " Evidence of abnormal rates of chromosomal aberrations
in male workers indicates that chloroprene may be mutagenic in
males.37
C. Other Industrial Agents
Many other substances widely used in industry are known or
suspected to have adverse effects on the reproductive systems of
occupationally exposed workers. Chromosomal change has been
reported in workers exposed to the solvent benzene, an element of
paint strippers, rubber cement, nylon, and detergents.38 Anesthetic
gases and ionizing radiation produce miscarriages and birth defects
in offspring of male and female operating room, x-ray, and dental
personnel.3 9 Occupational exposure to pesticides and chlorinated
hydrocarbons, used to manufacture drycleaning fluid and other
general solvents, causes serious fetal damage.40 The widespread
use of organic and inorganic mercury compounds in thermometers,
dental fillings, neon lights, mirrors, drugs, dyes, and explosives,
among other common consumer goods, makes especially disturbing
the findings of cerebral palsy and severe mental retardation in chil-
dren of exposed mothers.41
D. In Summary
The few extensive studies that have been done suggest that the
toxins studied cause reproductive harm to both the male and female
worker, which may then manifest itself as a birth defect in the
36 Wagoner, Infante & Brown, supra note 30, at 102.
37Id.
38A. Hmcxo & M. BRnNr, supra note 23, at C-19, C-20; Picciano, Cyto-
genetic Study of Workers Exposed to Benzene, 19 ENVe'L REsEAnCu 33, 34
(1979).
3OAd Hoe Committee on the Effect of Trace Anesthetics on the Health of
Operating Room Personnel, American Society of Anesthesiologists, Occupational
Disease Among Operating Room Personnel: A National Study, 41 AN sTmn.xoLoGY
321 (1974); Corbett, Cornell, Endres & Lieding, Birth Defects Among Children
of Nurse-anesthetists, 41 ANEsTHESIOLOGy 341 (1974); Hunt, Occupational Radia-
tion Exposure of Women Workers, 7 PnVMTImV MED. 294 (1978); Infante,
Genetic Hazards of Anesthetic Gases: An Epidemiologic Study, 13 CLcNIAL
Gmncs 123 (1978).
4 0 See A. HnscKo & M. BRUNT, supra note 23, at C-19, C-30 to C-33; Whorton,
Krauss, Marshall & Milby, Infertility in Male Pesticide Workers, 2 LANcEr 1259
(1977) (male infertility appeared to be related to duration of exposure to
pesticide).
41 Harada, Congenital Minamata Disease: Intrauterine Methylmercury Poison-
ing, 18 TERAToLO 285 (1978); Smith, Congenital Minamata Disease: Methyl-
Mercury Poisoning and Birth Defects in lapan, SOEH CoNRNncn, supra note 24,
at 75; Wilson, Environmental Chemicals, in 1 HANDBOOK oF TEnATOLOGY 357,
368 (J. Wilson & E. Fraser eds. 1977).
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worker's offspring. Such toxins often act prior to conception, and
therefore efforts undertaken by the employer to protect pregnant
employees only do not completely address the problem. Aside from
these studies, most research accumulated on the subject of repro-
ductive harm has focused on the pregnant worker, without due
regard for the possibility of reproductive harm to males and non-
pregnant females. 42  Use of these single-sex studies to justify a
policy that excludes only women threatens to distort the factual
record. Thus, discrimination might be judged permissible when it
would not be were a fuller factual record available.
Of course, there may come a time when the workplace has been
made healthful vis-a-vis the reproductive system of the worker-
that is, the mutagenic and gametotoxic effects of a particular hazard
have been eliminated-but has not yet been made safe for the
embryo or fetus because teratogenic effects remain. Even in this
case, however, the bright line of pregnancy is not a sufficient guide
in establishing the class of workers warranting protection. Many
teratogens pose their greatest risk to the developing embryo during
the first trimester of pregnancy 43 when the mother is not likely to
know that she is pregnant. It will thus be difficult to design a
policy that responds adequately to both women's employment rights
and the danger of harm to the unborn.
II. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
OF 1970
Although the focus of this Article is an analysis under title VII
of employer policies that exclude fertile women, a digression is
merited to discuss the possible applicability of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 197044 (OSH Act) to this problem. The
part of the OSH Act relevant here requires the employer to main-
tain a safe and healthful workplace for his employees. The statu-
tory embodiment of this requirement takes two forms-compliance
with standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) and enforcement proceedings for violation
of the OSH Act "general duty" clause.
42 See Manson, supra note 16, at 329-30.
4 3 See Furnish, supra note 15, at 122 n.259; Wilson, Current Status of Tera-
tology, in 1 HANDBOOK or TERATOLOcY 47, 50-54 (J. Wilson & E. Fraser eds.
1977); MICH. Note, supra note 15, at 240. Lead, for instance, poses the greatest
risk in the first trimester. See Bridbord, supra note 22, at 318.
4429 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979). See gen-
erally M. RoTBsTmw, OCCUPATIoNAL SArETr AND HEALTH LAw (1978 & Supp.
1980); J. SLAw, C. THomPsoN & F. Bm r, AGENcy, PARTr riaHn AND EMPLOyMENr
(1980).
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Under its standard setting power,45 OSHA has broad authority
to mandate "practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and places of employment." 46 Any standard promulgated
must be one that "most adequately assures, to the extent feasible" 47
that no employee will suffer a material impairment to his or her
health during the course of his or her working life. OSHA is also
empowered to promulgate "temporary emergency standards" when
the threat to employee health is sufficiently severe.48
45 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2) (1976).
46 Id. § 652(8). Such "practices, means, [and] methods" include not only
elimination of the hazard from the employee's working environment but also such
protective measures as warnings, protective equipment, and regularly scheduled
medical examinations when elimination of the hazard is not a feasible alternative.
See id. § 655(b) (7).
47 The concept of feasibility has both a technological and economic component.
See generally Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating
Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 EcoLocY L.Q.
285 (1978). The courts have generally interpreted the OSH Act to be "tech-
nology forcing," and, as such, OSHA may promulgate standards that, within
limits, require the improvement of existing or the development of new tech-
nologies. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 838 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v.
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Berger
& Riskin, supra, at 318-21. Considerations of cost to the employer are also
relevant to the determination of feasibility, see Industrial Union Dep't v. Brennan,
530 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1975), although merely because a standard is
financially burdensome does not mean that compliance thereto is infeasible. See
Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). To be
economically infeasible, the standard must threaten the financial integrity of the
industry as a whole; the demise of some marginal employers is not enough. Id.
In recent years the concept of feasibility has taken on an increasingly
economic hue. The Fifth Circuit now requires OSHA to justify any proposed
standard by reference to a full-blown cost-benefit analysis, see American Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980), a
position supported in part by at least one Supreme Court Justice. See Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2875-78 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring). See also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 617
F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980) (review of the
OSHA cotton-dust standard; the Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether or
not the OSH Act requires OSHA to cost-justify its standards). By executive
order, ex-president Jimmy Carter required all agencies, including OSHA, to draft
an "economic impact statement" for all regulations for which a major economic
effect is anticipated. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. 11 1979). The Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC), the quasi-judicial independent agency with jurisdiction to
review OSHA citations, see text accompanying note 55 infra, has begun to engage
in cost-benefit analyses. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co.,
OSHRC Docket No. 79-2438 at 21-22 (August 20, 1980).
4 8Ssee 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976); M. RonsTmN, supra note 44, at § 31.
Congress also granted OSHA the authority to adopt the broad range of public and
private industrial safety and health standards that predated the OSH Act. See
29 U.S.C. §§653(b)(2), 655(a) (1976). Most of these so-called "interim
standards" concerned employee safety as opposed to employee health, and thus
have little bearing on a discussion of toxins in the workplace. See Berger &
Biskin, supra note 47, at 295.
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Under the Act's "general duty" clause, the employer is charged
with maintaining a workplace "free from recognized hazards that
are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm" to
employees. 49 A "recognized hazard" is a dangerous condition known
either by the particular employer or generally within the given
industry to be hazardous.50 Unpreventable hazards are deemed
not to be recognized.51
Enforcement under the OSH Act is primarily by way of cita-
tion 52 and fine 53 coming at the heels of an OSHA-conducted in-
spection.54 The employer may contest a citation or fine before the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), a
quasi-judicial administrative body operating independently of
OSHA.5 5 The findings of the Commission may be appealed to the
federal appellate courts.,5
Although the OSH Act, unlike title VII, specifically addresses
the problem of workplace hazards, it alone is not adequate
to remedy sex-based employment discrimination purportedly
justified by the risk of reproductive harm. The OSH Act does not,
for instance, contain any sex-sensitive antidiscrimination provision;
nothing in the Act expressly prevents an employer from excluding
an entire class if he so chooses.57 The OSH Act would come into
play only if the employer opted to employ members of a given sex
and the workplace was unhealthful for them. But even here, the
Act's protection is not necessarily complete, as the employer may be
49 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a) ( 1) (1976).
50 See Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1977);
Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974).
. 51 See National Realty & Const. Co. v. OSHA, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
5229 U.S.C. § 658, 659 (1976); see M. ROTSTmN, supra note 44, at
9 241-252.
53 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
541d. § 570; see M. RornSrsTN, supra note 44, at §§ 221-233.
55 See 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979); Berger &
Riskin, supra note 47, at 303-09.
5S 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1976).
57 See Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., OSHRC Docket No.
79-5762 (July 15, 1980), in which OSHA charged that American Cyanamid's
"fetus protection policy," which conditioned employment for fertile women in the
lead pigments division on sterilization, violated OSHA's general duty clause. The
administrative law judge rejected this contention because, inter alia, issues in-
volving sex discrimination are preempted from OSHA's jurisdiction by title VII.
See id. 9-11; 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976); note 11 supra; notes 241-54 infra &
accompanying text. On the subject of preemption of the OSH Act by other
federal statutes, see generally Comment, Interpreting OSHA's Pre-emption Clause:
Farmworkers as a Case Study, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1509 (1980).
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under no legal obligation to eliminate the reproductive hazard. If,
for example, the hazard is not "recognized," no duty to eliminate it
attaches under the general duty clause. And even if the hazard is
recognized, it is an open question whether a hazard impinging only
upon the reproductive system is one likely to cause "death or seri-
ous physical harm" to employees. This would leave whatever
relevant standards OSHA had promulgated as the only source of
any employer duty to eliminate the hazard.
Even protection under OSHA-promulgated standards may be
inadequate. First, there may be no applicable standard. Given
the propensity of industry to litigate virtually every permanent
standard issued 58 and the slowness with which OSHA promulgates
permanent standards in the first place, 9 there remain large num-
bers of toxins about which OSHA has done nothing.
Second, an existing standard may not afford adequate protec-
tion against reproductive harm. Both the appellate courts and the
administrative agencies have begun to subject regulations to so-
called "cost-benefit" analysis, and zero-risk standards are unlikely
to be mandated.60 This will probably have its greatest impact in
situations of teratogenic harm only. In those cases, the employee,
often less susceptible than the fetus, would not be harmed, and
causation may be difficult to prove.6' Even if the causal link is
clear, the harm to the unborn might more cheaply be avoided
by such measures as wholesale exclusion or a policy requiring birth
control or sterilization as a condition of employment.62 If a line
5 See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (cotton dust), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980); American Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1978) (benzene), aff'd sub nom.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (coke oven
emissions), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc.
v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.) (vinyl chloride), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(asbestos dust).
59 See Furnish, supra note 15, at 68 & n.22.-
6 0 See note 47 supra; Furnish, supra note 15, at 69-70.
61 A plurality of the Supreme Court, in invalidating OSHA's permanent stand-
ards for exposure to benzene, a suspected carcinogen, required that OSHA prove
by substantial evidence that the hazard in question poses a "significant risk" to
the health of employees, and that compliance with the proposed standards will
materially reduce that risk. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2865 (1980). Given the dearth of credible scientific evi-
dence linking many suspect chemicals with reproductive harm, see note 16 supra
& accompanying text, this burden of proof may be especially difficult for OSHA
to meet in the context of standard promulgation for protection against reproductive
harm.
62 This is not to say that either of these alternatives actually would be allowed
under the OSH Act.
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must be drawn, it will probably be drawn at a point that leaves
some harm to the unborn as a substantial risk.
Finally, the OSH Act enforcement mechanism is ill-suited to
remedy problems related to reproductive harm and sex discrimina-
tion. The broad, affirmative relief available under title VII cannot
be had under the OSH Act, as the citation and fine system permits
only an ineffective form of monetary coercion.63 Injunctive relief
is available only upon petition of the Secretary of Labor, and only
when the danger alleged could "reasonably be expected to cause
death or serious physical harm" 64-a standard unlikely to be met
in the case of reproductive injury. Employees themselves have
virtually no direct power to instigate a proceeding. 5 They may
lodge a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration, but OSHA decides whether an inspection is warranted. 66
From the employee's perspective, therefore, the OSH Act pro-
vides limited access for redress and no individual remedy for viola-
tions. Title VII, which provides broad, equitable remedies and a
private right of action, is a more effective statutory tool.
III. TiTLE VII
Title VII 7 is the primary federal antidiscrimination statute.
Under title VII, the employer will not be permitted to claim that
he or she has no duty to eliminate the reproductive hazard merely
because discrimination is much "cheaper" than cleaning up the
workplace. Such unwarranted discrimination is exactly what title
VII forbids. Nor will the employer be permitted to justify dis-
crimination by pointing to the possibility of reproductive harm.
Instead, title VII may actually place upon the employer a duty
to clean up the workplace independent of, but analogous to, that
imposed by the OSH Act. At the least, the employee would be
entitled to reinstatement and back pay as the result of a favorable
order. The employee is thus likely to turn to title VII to obtain
complete relief.
68 See notes 52-54 supra & accompanying text.
6429 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976). As of the date of this Article's publication,
there are no reported cases in which injunctive relief has been sought or granted
under this section.
65The only exception is if OSHA "arbitrarily or capriciously" fails to seek
injunctive relief, in which case an employee in "imminent danger" may petition in
federal district court for a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of Labor. 2909
U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976).
66 See 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976).
6 42 U.S. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. M 1979).
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A. The Analytical Framework
Section 703(a) (1) of title VII prohibits employers "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex." 6
8
A plaintiff seeking title VII relief has the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.!9 To establish
the prima facie case, a plaintiff can proceed under a disparate treat-
ment or a disparate impact theory.70 Under a disparate treatment
theory, the plaintiff alleges that the employer "simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin." 71 Proof of a discriminatory mo-
tive is crucial in disparate treatment cases, but direct proof of
actual intent to discriminate is not required.72
When the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the action in question.3 The Supreme Court has emphasized that
this burden is not a heavy one.74 Once the employer articulates a
legitimate explanation for his action, the plaintiff may rebut the
stated reason as pretextual.75
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976).
8 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); L. MODjESuA,
HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DiscRnINAurON CASES § 1.8 (1980).
7o International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
71Id.; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
72 For example, intent can be inferred from convincing statistical evidence.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
73 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-03 (1973).
74 The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated
by the proffered reasons .... It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through
the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 49 U.S.L.W. 4214, 4216 (U.S. Mar. 3,
1981) (No. 79-1764) (citation and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (per
curiam). Courts have emphasized that the burden of articulating a reason does
not affect the burden of persuasion, which at all times rests with the plaintiff.
Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 543 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1979).
75McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). "The
method suggested in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, however, was
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Employers facing a disparate treatment claim may in a few
cases avail themselves of a statutory exception. Title VII does per-
mit discriminatory action based upon sex when sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular enterprise38 The BFOQ de-
fense has been construed as an extremely narrow exception to the
prohibition against sex discrimination."7 The defense will not vali-
date employment practices based upon stereotypes, generalizations,
or state protective laws that embody such generalizations."8
Under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff claims that a
facially neutral employment practice violates title VII because its
effects fall more harshly on one protected group than another.
7 9
Proof of discriminatory motive is irrelevant.8 0 If the plaintiff can
establish that a neutral employment practice has a disparate im-
pact, the employer must show that the challenged practice has a
"manifest relationship to the employment in question." 8, Not
only must the practice be "job-related," s2 but there must be no
less discriminatory alternative available to the employer to accom-
never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on
the critical question of discrimination." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978).
7942 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (1976). See L. MODiESKA, supra note 69, at
§ 1.18; James & Alaimo, BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 Cxxv. ST.
L. REv. 1 (1977); Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occu-
pational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. Rv. 1025 (1977).
7 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
7 8 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1975); L. MODJESKA, supra
note 69, at § 1.18.
79 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See L. MoDJESKA, supra
note 69, at § 1.9.
S0Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Plaintiffs may rely on statistical evidence to estab-
lish the disparate impact of the challenged practice. See International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40. Such statistics, however, are not irrefutable and
"their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." Id.
340; accord, New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). See also
L. MODJESKA, supra note 69, at § 1.10.
81 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). But see New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979), suggesting that, as in
disparate treatment cases employing the McDonnell Douglas test, see notes 73-75
supra & accompanying text, the ultimate burden of persuasion resides with the
plaintiff.
82 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
Some courts of appeals permit the employer to assert other 'legitimate" business
interests besides job-relatedness as a justification for impact discrimination. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797-800 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
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plish the same end.8 3 Of course, if the plaintiff can prove that the
facially neutral policy is a pretext for purposeful discrimination, no
such defense is available to the employer. The case simply be-
comes one of disparate treatment, justifiable only if the employer
can prove that sex is a BFOQ.84
B. Analysis Under Current Title VII Law
The first question to be answered is whether title VII 85 in its
current form would ever countenance the practice of excluding fer-
tile women, but not fertile men,8 6 from employment on the basis
of the possible harm to their unborn. The short answer is no.
Current law would hold such a policy to be sex discrimination not
justifiable under any existing formulation of either the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense or the manifest business
necessity defense.
1. Does the Exclusion Constitute Sex
Discrimination?
As the discussion below demonstrates, any employer policy that
results in the exclusion of fertile women, but not fertile men, from
the workplace would be considered sex discrimination under title
VII. This conclusion can be reached in any of four alternative
ways.
First, I will argue that the 1978 "pregnancy amendment" to
title VII, s7 which prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, also
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the capacity to become
pregnant. Second, even if the pregnancy amendment were found
to be inapplicable, the refusal to hire fertile women imposes upon
women a requirement for employment that is not imposed on men-
the inability to reproduce. This constitutes an unlawful sex classi-
fication under section 703(a)(1) of title VII. A similar analysis
83Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977). The burden of proving
the existence of a less discriminatory alternative resides with the plaintiff. But see
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979), in which
the Court made no mention of the less-discriminatory-alternative leg of the Dothard
test despite an employer policy that was massively over-inclusive.
84 See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
86 The word "fertile" is used throughout this Article to mean "capable of repro-
ducing," and refers to both men and women.
8742 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. I 1979).
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applies in those cases in which the substance harms both male and
female workers (or their offspring) but the employer protects only
female workers from the health risks of occupational exposure.
Finally, the exclusion of fertile women from employment has a
clearly disproportionate adverse impact upon the employment
opportunities of women.
a. The 1978 "Pregnancy Amendment"
In October 1978, Congress amended title VII by adding section
701(k), which prohibits discrimination in employment "because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions." 11 The specific purpose of Congress in enacting section
701(k) was to overturn the result in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert,8 in which the Supreme Court held that the employer, whose
disability income insurance plan excluded pregnancy from coverage,
did not violate title VII.90 The Court found that the plan dis-
criminated not against the class of women workers but only against
the class of pregnant workers. 91 In so holding, the Court missed
the obvious fact that pregnancy is a unique female characteristic-
and that any classification based on pregnancy is, inevitably, a sex-
based classification. Instead, the Court held that pregnancy is an
objectively identifiable condition, and that a classification based
88 Pub. L. No. 95-555, §1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k)
(Supp. 1H 1979)).
89429 U.S. 125 (1976).
9OThe congressional intent to overrule Gilbert is evident on the face of the
statutory text, quoted here in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
For the one case construing this amendment since its enactment, see Harriss v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prae. Dec. 31,425 (9th Cir. 1980). Some
courts have simply not gotten the message. See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980) (assuming that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is not disparate treatment without ever mentioning the amendment), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076).
The passage of the pregnancy amendment does not completely bury Gilbert.
The amendment is not retroactive, see Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 631 F.2d
1136, 1139-40 (4th Cir. 1980), and hence discrimination on the basis of capacity to
conceive occurring before the amendments passage must be analyzed as if Gilbert
were still good law.
For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the amendment, see Furnish,
supra note 15, at 77-83.
91429 U.S. at 134-35 (relying on Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
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thereon is not a sex classification, but rather a classification based on
a characteristic possessed by some women.
92
Section 701(k) clearly "corrects" the Gilbert result.9 3 But the
intended scope of the amendment is not apparent on the face of the
statutory text. The section does not, for example, speak explicitly
to discrimination on the basis of the woman's fertility, or capacity
to become pregnant. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, how-
ever, that the pregnancy amendment was intended to encompass
just such capacity. The House report accompanying section 701(k)
states that the purpose of the bill was to extend protection against
all forms of sex discrimination "to the whole range of matters con-
cerning the childbearing process." 9 The report states that "the
assumption that women will become pregannt [sic] and leave the
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal employees, and
is at the Toot of the discriminatory practices which keep women
in low-paying and dead-end jobs." 95 The report further quotes
with approval the observation of Justice Stevens, dissenting in
Gilbert, that "it is the capacity to become pregnant which pri-
marily differentiates the female from the male." 96
Section 701(k) thus was intended not only to forbid discrimi-
nation against pregnant workers, but also to forbid discrimination
against workers with the capacity to become pregnant. The amend-
ment reaffirms the principle that all workers, including pregnant
and potentially pregnant workers, "be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work." OT
b. Reproductive Capacity as a Sex-Based Condition
for Employment
A court may, of course, find that the "pregnancy amendment"
applies only to employees who are or have been pregnant and does
not protect employees who have been discriminated against because
of their capacity to become pregnant. Such a finding would not
end the inquiry as to whether discrimination in hiring based on
childbearing capacity constitutes sex discrimination actionable
under section 703(a)(1) of title VII. Even without the benefit of
92 Id.
93 See note 90 supra.
04H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4753.
95 Id. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 4751.
9Id. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4750 (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(emphasis added).
97 Id. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 4751.
1981]
816 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the pregnancy amendment, it can be forcefully argued that the
employer who excludes fertile women discriminates among repro-
ductively capable employees solely on the basis of sex.
The employer who excludes women with childbearing capacity
from certain jobs imposes upon all women, and upon no men, the
employment condition that they be incapable of reproducing. In
effect, he chooses among all reproductively capable applicants only
the males and rejects the females. He further discriminates among
the potential employees by requiring females to disclose personal
information that is not asked of the males. This constitutes dis-
parate treatment on the basis of sex.
The employer, citing Gilbert, may argue that the capacity to
bear children is an objectively identifiable,9 gender-neutral condi-
tion and that the classification based thereon happens to exclude
only women. On the surface, this argument is appealing. "Ca-
pacity to become pregnant," says the employer, "is analogous to
being pregnant"-and even if such capacity falls outside the
parameters of the pregnancy amendment, it clearly is within the
bounds of the Gilbert decision. Thus, following Gilbert's logic,
an employer who discriminates against persons with the capacity to
become pregnant is not discriminating on the basis of sex-even
though every person in the discriminated-against class happens to
be a woman.
This reasoning is facile, but fallacious. Such a "sex-plus"
argument has already been rejected by the Supreme Court in the
context of discrimination against mothers with children,99 and pre-
sumably would be rejected here.1°° Gilbert does not compel any
98 The capacity to bear children is not actually an objectively identifiable con-
dition. Absent a physical defect of some kind or a sterilization procedure, all women
of childbearing age are assumed to be capable of conceiving.
99 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
The employer in Phillips refused to hire mothers, but not fathers, of small children.
See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing
en bano denied, 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded per curiam,
400 U.S. 542 (1971). The Supreme Court remanded for fuller development of the
record, noting, however, that section 703(a) did not permit "one hiring policy for
women and another for men-each having pre-school-age children." 400 U.S. at
544.
100 Cf., e.g., Harper v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 619 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir.
1980) (employer required female employee on maternity leave to experience a
normal menstrual cycle before permitting her to return to work); In re Con-
solidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir.
1978) (motherhood), cert. granted sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 78-1545); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets
Co., 550 F.2d 364, 369-71 (6th Cir. 1977) (unwed pregnancy).
The courts have been somewhat more accepting of the "sex-plus" argument in
the context of discrimination based upon both sex and personal appearance. See
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other result. The Gilbert Court, after all, distinguished between
pregnant and nonpregnant persons. The analogous distinction
here is between fertile and nonfertile persons. For while the ca-
pacity to bear children is admittedly a unique female characteristic,
it is nonetheless merely the feminine role in the general human
capacity to reproduce. Thus, even under the Gilbert rationale,
any employment policy that discriminated against fertile women
only (as opposed to fertile persons, both men and women) clearly
discriminates on the basis of sex.
c. Relative Risk of Harm as a Sex-Based Classification
The employer may articulate a legitimate interest in avoiding
the risk of harm to the female worker or her future child as the
basis for the classification. The employer will assert that a classifi-
cation based on this risk factor does not constitute disparate
treatment.
This argument is untenable. In the case of lead, for example,
occupational exposure has multiple adverse effects on the reproduc-
tive systems of both male and female workers.10 The medical
experts have not, however, established a direct causal relationship
between the mutagenic and teratogenic effects of lead and particular
congenital birth defects. 102 The employer cannot, therefore, estab-
lish that there are identifiable preconception injuries to which po-
tential children of exposed woman are vulnerable and from which
children of exposed men are immune. There is, as well, no medi-
cal evidence that establishes the relative risks of harm to exposed
males and females. Thus, while the practice of excluding fertile
women discriminates literally on the basis of the capacity to bear
children, the employer discriminates on the basis of sex by protect-
ing its female employees, but not its male employees, from the risk
of producing a congenitally defective child. The discrimination
occurs within the class of reproductively capable workers who face
a risk of injury to themselves or a future child from occupational
exposure to lead, and the line is drawn according to the sex of the
potential parent.
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089-92 (5th Cir.
1975) (en bane) (employer may refuse to employ long-haired males while hiring
long-haired females; Philips distinguished on the ground that the latter involved
the "fundamental right" to bear children). But see Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (employer may not require only
female bank personnel to wear uniforms).
101 See notes 21-26 supra & accompanying text.
302 J. Sunw AN, supra note 16, at 151-52.
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Even if the employer could show that women as a class face a
greater average risk of injury from occupational exposure to a toxic
substance than do men, 03 the practice of excluding fertile women
nonetheless constitutes disparate treatment under section 703(a)(1).
As the Supreme Court made clear in City of Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Water and Power v. Manhart,104 statistically verifiable
generalizations about the sexes will not rebut a claim of disparate
treatment under that section. There, the Court held that an em-
ployer who charged women employees a greater monthly contribu-
tion than was charged men for the same pension benefits violated
section 703(a)(1), even though the statistics demonstrate that women
as a class live longer than men:
The statute makes it unlawful "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
-.. The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous.
It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. If height
is required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused
employment merely because, on the average, women are
too short. Even a true generalization about the class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom
the generalization does not apply.10 5
The critical fact with respect to the capacity to bear children,
as it was with respect to longevity in Manhart, is that there is no
assurance that any individual woman will fit the generalization
that exposed women will produce defective progeny. As in Man-
hart, the employer cannot predetermine which women will experi-
ence adverse pregnancies as the result of occupational exposure to
the toxic substance and which women will not. The impossibility
of identifying those who will be harmed does not alter the require-
ment of section 703(a)(1) that women be treated in employment as
individuals and not as members of a class. Such a justification for
disparate treatment may be relevant to the defenses under title VII
but not to the applicability of section 703(a)(1).
0 3 The available medical evidence as to mutagens and gametotoxins (which
operate on the reproductive cells) will not support a finding that females face a
greater average risk of reproductive impairment. See notes 16-43 supra & ac-
companying text. If the substance has purely teratogenic effects (affects the fetus
directly), however, there is a theoretically greater aggregate risk to the offspring
of female workers than to the offspring of male workers.
104 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
105 Id. 708 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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d. Disparate Impact
An employer could attempt to avoid falling under the dis-
parate treatment standard of title VII by enacting an exclusionary
policy, couched in neutral terms, that purports to respond to the
health needs of employees or their unborn. An example would be
a policy flatly prohibiting the employment of any fertile male or
female. Assuming that such a facially neutral policy was not vul-
nerable to attack on grounds of pretext, it would survive scrutiny
under a disparate treatment analysis.
Such a practice might not, however, escape the reach of title
VII entirely. If, as implemented, it were to exclude a dispropor-
tionate number of one sex, discrimination under title VII could
still be found on the ground that the practice affected one sex
disproportionately from the other. 06 Continuing with the example
above, a policy excluding all fertile individuals would probably be
subject to challenge by virtue of the medical reality that males
generally remain fertile longer than females. 107
Most existing examples of discrimination justified by the
specter of reproductive harm are limited to practices adversely
affecting women; these are so obviously discriminatory that they
are easily vulnerable on disparate treatment grounds. Nonethe-
less, the possibility that an employer may attempt to reimplement
such a policy by framing it in neutral terms must be foreseen and
addressed.
2. Rebutting the Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of sex discrimi-
nation on either disparate treatment or disparate impact grounds,
the burden of proof 108 shifts to the employer to, in essence, "justify"
the discrimination. The standard of justification necessary is de-
pendent on the plaintiff's prima facie case; a showing of disparate
treatment on the basis of sex may be justified only by proving that
sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification." Disparate impact,
untainted by pretext, may be justified by proving that the policy
or practice giving rise to the disparate impact is a "manifest business
necessity."
'
0 6 See text accompanying notes 79-84 supra.
107 Less obvious cases of disparate impact are generally proven by resort to
statistical evidence. See generally Hricko, supra note 2, at 400. For a summary
of demographic sources and statistics concerning employment during pregnancy,
see J. STELLmAN, supra note 16, at 139-44.
10 8 See notes 73, 74 & 81 supra & accompanying text.
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a. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense
Section 703(e) of title VII provides that "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of this subchapter, ... it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees ... on the basis of ... sex ... in those certain instances
where . . .sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise." 109
The Supreme Court first construed the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) in Dothard v. Rawlinson .10 and held that
the likelihood of sexual assault by inmates justified the employer's
refusal to hire women as correctional counselors in a maximum
security male prison facility. The opinion states that "the BFOQ
exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception
to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex," M
but the Court provided no discrete test for its application in future
cases. The employer who excludes fertile women from employ-
ment could thus argue that Dothard supports the contention that
a fertile woman's susceptibility to reproductive injury, or potential
harm to her future children, justifies sex as a BFOQ.
The cases are, however, distinguishable on their facts. The
Court in Dothard found that the risk of sexual assault to the fe-
male plaintiff justified the discrimination because it "directly un-
dermine[d] her capacity to provide the security that is the essence
of a correctional counselor's responsibility." 112 Despite serious
flaws in the majority opinion,1 3 the Court correctly focused the
inquiry on the applicant's ability to perform the essential duties of
the job involved. In the absence of evidence that fertile women
cannot perform the essential duties of the job, Dothard lends no
support for the proposition that susceptibility of women to injury
is itself a sufficient basis for the BFOQ defense.
The BFOQ defense has not enjoyed consistent interpretation
by the lower courts. The standard for the bona fide occupational
qualification originally developed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.14 states that "sexual
109 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(e) (1976).
110 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
M1 Id. 334 (footnote omitted). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1980) (EEOC
Guidelines).
112 433 U.S. at 336.
-13Id. 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See notes 173-75 infra & accompanying
14 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 12:798
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN THE WORKPLACE
characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to one degree
or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for
the application of the BFOQ exception." 115 Under this test, the
employer must demonstrate that the performance of the job re-
quires that the worker possess a sexual characteristic unique to the
members of one sex. Even in cases in which certain biological
attributes, such as physical strength, are necessary for job perform-
ance, the BFOQ exception will not justify the exclusion of all
women from employment unless the employer shows that a male
sexual characteristic is "crucial to the successful performance of
the job" 116 involved.
The other major standard evolves from Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.117 and Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc."" The Weeks-Diaz standard, cited but not
specifically adopted in Dothard,"9 requires that "in order to rely
.on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer
has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties
of the job involved." 120 In addition, the employer must demon-
strate that the particular duties of the job involved are necessary to
the employer's business to the extent that "the essence of the busi-
ness operation would be undermined by not hiring members of
one sex exclusively." 121
115 Id. 1225.
The Ninth Circuit may have recently abandoned its own test, see Harriss v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. f731,425 (9th Cir. 1980), in
favor of the Weeks-Diaz standard discussed at text accompanying notes 117-22
infra. This would leave the Seventh Circuit as the only circuit explicitly en-
dorsing the Rosenfeld test. See In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the
Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No.
-78-1545).
116 Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1224.
117 408 F.2d 228 (Sth Cir. 1969).
118 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
119 433 U.S. at 333.
12o Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
ll Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388 (emphasis in original).
The most concise formulation of the Weeks-Diaz test is as follows:
[A]n employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of showing
(1) that its policy ". . . is reasonably necessary to the essence of its
business . . .", and that (2) the employer has ". . . a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons within the class . . . would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved,
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In Diaz, the source of the "essence of the business" require-
ment, the Fifth Circuit considered the airline's refusal to hire males
as flight attendants. The court rejected as a basis for the BFOQ
the employer's assertion that all or substantially all men lacked the
ability to make its passengers feel safe and comfortable, saying that
the nonmechanical aspects of the job were tangential and not "rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation" of the employer's
business.122
The two standards differ primarily in that the Weeks-Diaz
standard would appear to permit the employer to exclude all women
from a job when some women are fully capable of performing.
Under the Rosenfeld standard, unless the employer can demon-
strate that a male or female sex characteristic is necessary to the
employer's business, title VII requires an individual evaluation of
ability to perform.2 3
Employers who exclude all fertile women but no fertile men
can assert three possible justifications for such a practice: (1) the
practice prevents harm to the female employee; (2) the practice
prevents harm to the fetus, or (3) the practice avoids the cost of
liability to the worker and a subsequently conceived child if the
worker suffers an adverse pregnancy caused by exposure to the toxic
substance, and avoids the cost of developing and implementing
technology that would reduce the risk of reproductive harm from
exposure to the toxic substance. These objectives for excluding
women with childbearing capacity satisfy neither of the established
tests for the BFOQ.
or that it is impossible or impractical to deal with persons .. . on an
individualized basis...."
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 497 (E.D. Va. 1978)
(quoting Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977)), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part per curiam, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3643 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076).
At least one court has focused upon the essence of the job in question rather
than the essence of the business. See, e.g., Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Del. 1977). This is a disturbing development
because it might permit an employer to define the position in sexist terms-for
example, airline cabin attendants must be "maternal"--and thus render sex a valid
BFOQ, The Diaz "essence of the business" test forecloses this result unless the
business itself is sexist. See Sirota, supra note 76, at 1066-70.
122 Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
128 The Rosenfeld standard, with its narrower construction, is the more ap-
propriate choice. Consistent with the policy behind title VII, it mandates that
employers "eliminate subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped concep-
tions regarding the physical ability of women to do particular work." 444 F.2d
at 1225. Conversely, the Weeks-Diaz standard permits the employer to exclude
all women from employment upon a showing that substantially all women cannot
perform the job, thus denying employment opportunities to women who are
qualified. The "substantially all women" standard is vague, moreover, and thus
allows employers to be much more subjective in their hiring policies.
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(i) Risk of Harm to the Worker
Although the capacity to become pregnant does not itself affect
job performance, the employer could assert that the likelihood of
injury to the worker makes sex or infertility a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. It must be kept in mind that the risk of harm
that the employer would be asserting would not be immediate and
incapacitating, but rather, as in the case of lead poisoning,14 in-
sidious and not necessarily incapacitating in the short run. In
these circumstances, in which the hazard does not incapacitate or
otherwise adversely affect the employee's performance on the shop
floor, the risk of harm to the employee is not relevant to any pos-
sible BFOQ defense.
Nowhere is this principle better illustrated than in early cases
striking down sex-based exclusions otherwise justified by state "pro-
tective labor laws." Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,1-5 for ex-
ample, raised the issue whether a state law prohibiting the employ-
ment of women to lift weights in excess of fifty pounds or to labor
more than ten hours per day justified the employer's refusal to hire
women workers. The court found that the BFOQ defense "estab-
lishes a narrow exception inapplicable where, as here, employment
-opportunities are denied on the basis of characterizations of the
physical capabilities and endurance of women, even when those
characteristics are recognized in state legislation." 126
A plethora of federal and state court decisions have reached
the same result and invalidated state protective labor laws that
prohibited women from working in particular jobs or limited the
weights that women may lift, the maximum number of hours they
may work, the time of day they may work, and the amount of work
they may do prior to childbirth.127 The thrust of these laws-pro-
124 See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
125 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
126 Id. 1227. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1980).
127 See, e.g., Krause v. Sacramento Inn, 479 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1973) (job
prohibition law); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 393
(D.D.C. 1972) (hours law); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp.
602 (E.D. La. 1971) (hours law), aff'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325
F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (hours law), aff'd, 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (job
prohibition, weight and hour laws), remanded on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1972); Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971)
(hours law); General Elea. Co. v. Young, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 560 (W.D. Ky.
1971) (hours law); Binehart v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 3 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 851 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (job prohibition and weight laws); Manning v. General
Motors Corp., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 968 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (job prohibition,
-weight and hour laws), aff'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
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tecting women as a class from dangerous or hazardous employment-
violates the letter as well as the policy of title VII, which requires
individual rather than class considerations in employment decisions.
It certainly stands to reason that if the state, with its broad legisla-
tive power, may not lawfully "protect" women from dangerous
jobs on the basis of their supposed capabilities and endurance, then
the individual employer also lacks the power under title VII to
promulgate an exclusionary policy for the same purpose and on
the same basis.
128
It might appear ironic that employee health is not a sufficient
justification for discrimination. The following passage from Weeks
v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.129 places this apparent
irony in its proper perspective:
Title VII rejects . . . romantic paternalism as unduly Vic-
torian and instead vests individual women with the power
to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks.
Men have always had the right to determine whether the
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dan-
denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973); Local 246, Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (weight law); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. III. 1970) (hours law);
McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (job pro-
hibition law); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969)
(weight law); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1971) (job prohibition law); Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St.
2d 173, 281 N.E.2d 1 (1972) (hours, weight and job prohibition laws).
128 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
Although most state protective laws have been struck down or rescinded,
there continues to be a litany of cases invalidating sexually discriminatory employer
policies purportedly justified by a safety risk to the female employee. See, e.g.,
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 497 (E.D. Va. 1978) (con-
cern for the health and welfare of its flight attendant, albeit laudatory, does not
touch upon the essence of the airline's business), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
per curiam, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S.
Mar. 3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076); Maclennan v. American Airlines, Inc.,
440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977) (that some female flight attendants might be
incapacitated by pregnancy does not establish sex as a BFOQ); Ruckel v. Essex
Int'l, Inc., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 403 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (mere fact that all
sixteen women to whom heavy industrial jobs were offered turned them down does
not make sex a BFOQ). Cases upholding similar policies, such as Harriss v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. ff 31,425 (9th Cir. 1980) and
Condit v. United Air Lines, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 934 (1978), are distinguishable because they rely upon a finding of a safety
risk to a third party. See note 188 infra; Usey v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). Nor does the Supreme Court's allowance of an
exclusion of women from the position of high-security prison guard in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), undermine this principle. Although the risk of
sexual assault upon the female guard was a factor in the Court's analysis, it was
relevant only in so far as it impacted on the ability of the female guard to perform
the essential duties of a "correctional counselor." Id. 335-36. But see text
accompanying notes 173-75 infra.
129 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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gerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth
the candle. The promise of title VII is that women are
now to be on equal footing. 30
The message simply is that if men are permitted to assume the
risk of unhealthful employment, so too should women. 131
(ii) Risk of Harm to the Unborn
The next major issue is whether the employer's concern for the
health of the future children of its workers justifies the establish-
ment of sex as a bona fide occupational qualification. Under a
principled application of either the Weeks-Diaz or Rosenfeld stand-
ard, such a showing would be impossible. If one applies the Weeks-
Diaz test, it is obvious that the state of health of the employee's
unborn in no way "touches the essence" of the employer's business.
The Rosenfeld standard fares no better. For although the capacity
to become pregnant is a unique physical characteristic, the inability
to conceive a normal child is not "crucial to the successful per-
formance" of the employee's job.13 2 Simply stated, the mere fact
that a workplace hazard has affected the female employee's capacity
to bear healthy children does not necessarily affect her ability to
work. Thus, under either the Weeks-Diaz or Rosenfeld standard,
the necessary nexus between the health of the unborn child and the
,employee's job or employer's business does not exist.
Even if the health of the unborn could be taken into account,
under the Weeks-Diaz test it would be particularly difficult for
the employer to prove that "all or substantially all" fertile women
risk producing unhealthy children because of workplace exposure
to toxic substances. For various reasons, a substantial number of
130 Id. 236.
131 See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) ("[Tlhe argu-
ment that a particular job is too dangerous for women may appropriately be met
by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman
to make that choice for herself.") (footnote omitted).
132 Admittedly, an employer could argue that ancillary problems caused, for
example, by the employee's having to care for her defective child-such as in-
creased absenteeism and anxiety-may adversely affect her job performance.
Whether or not this is true as a factual matter, it is not determinative. It may be
assumed that there are many mothers who have given birth to defective children
who are productive members of the work force. Thus, not bearing such a child
is not "crucial" to successful job performance. Cf. In re Consolidated Pretrial
Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1978) (that
mother's concern for her children might affect her job performance is not enough
to establish sex as a BFOQ under Rosenfeld), cert. granted sub nom. Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1981) (No. 78-1545).
But cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam)
<remanding for further findings of fact as to whether "conflicting family obligations"
of mothers with children makes sex a BFOQ).
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women with childbearing capacity will never become pregnant. Of
those who do conceive, many will give birth to healthy children.
Therefore, the "all or substantially all" leg of the Diaz test could
not be met.
The only case to face the issue squarely, 33 Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc.,1?A supports this analysis. Burwell rejected the em-
ployer's argument that its asserted interest in the health of the
flight attendant's future child justified its policy of placing preg-
nant attendants on indefinite leave. The court stated that the
employer "cannot rest its BFOQ defense on its concern for the
health and welfare of flight attendants and their unborn children.
Such concerns are laudatory, but do not touch upon the essence of
[the employer's] business." 15
(iii) Cost to the Employer
The final question to ask in relation to the BFOQ defense is-
whether the employer could successfully argue that the costs asso-
ciated with hiring fertile women justify sex as a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. Such costs would include (1) the cost of
increased insurance premiums or tort liability to compensate for pos-
sible harm to the employee's reproductive system; 136 (2) possible
133 Some courts appear to have assumed that the risk of fetal harm is an
appropriate consideration when that issue was not necessary to decide the case.
See, e.g., Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320, 326 & n.4 (N.D. Ohio
1979). In fact, in Doerr, a case in which an employee challenged B.F. Goodrich's
policy of excluding women from jobs involving vinyl chloride, see note 11 supra,
the court indicated that the employer would probably prevail on the merits if
the merits were reached. 484 F. Supp. at 326.
134458 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per
curiam, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar.
3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076).
185 Id. 497.
136 Compensation for occupational injury generally comes from a state's workers'
compensation fund. See 4 A. LABsoN, TiH LAw oF WoamAN's CoMPENsAnioN
§ 92.10 (1980). It is not clear, however, that a woman suffering harm to her
reproductive system caused by an unhealthful workplace could recover workers'
compensation benefits. Workers' compensation usually covers only injuries that
interfere with the worker's effectiveness on the job. 2 A. LAaso, supra, at § 57.
Reproductive harm is not generally of this type. See 2A A. LAnsoN, supra at
§ 65.20.
If the injury is not covered by the state's workers' compensation law, the
employee may have a common law cause of action in tort. Recovery is not neces-
sarily forthcoming here, either. Unless the employer is held liable on a no-fault
principle, see, e.g., REsTATEm-T (SEco") oF ToRTs § 519 (1977) (imposing
absolute liability for certain "abnormally dangerous" activity), he would probably
be able to interpose an assumption of risk or contributory negligence defense if
the employee had been adequately warned of the hazard. Id. §§ 523, 524. See
also text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
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liability arising from tortious injury to the unborn child, 37 and
(3) the cost, should the employer be required to bear it, of lower-
ing the workplace exposure levels of the toxin in question so as to
reduce or eliminate the risk of injury. Note that this question is
not the same as asking whether harm to the employee or her un-
born is in itself relevant to the establishment of a BFOQ defense.
The difference here is that now the costs associated with such harm
have been absorbed into the employer's costs of doing business. In
this manner, harm to the worker and her unborn may in fact be-
come relevant to the "essence" of the employer's business.
It could be argued that the Supreme Court has already de-
cided that cost is never relevant to the establishment of a BFOQ
defense. In City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
v. Manhart,38 the employee-plaintiffs claimed that the employer's
practice of exacting larger contributions towards a pension plan
from women than from men constituted unlawful discrimination
under title VII. The employer argued, inter alia, "that the prima
facie showing of discrimination based on evidence of different con-
tributions for the respective sexes is rebutted by its demonstration
that there is a like difference in the cost of providing benefits for
the respective classes." 1s3 The Court rejected this argument out-
right: "That argument might prevail if Title VII contained a cost-
justification defense comparable to the affirmative defense available
in a price discrimination suit. But neither Congress nor the courts
have recognized such a defense under Title VII." ' 4o The Court
thus held that title VII does not permit a cost-based defense to a
showing of unlawful discriminatory employment practices.
's7 The question of liability for injury to unborn and unconceived children is
a mare's nest of confusion and uncertainty. Generally, the defendant may be
liable for injuries resulting in the disability to or death of a live-born infant or
the prenatal death of a viable fetus, if such injuries were caused by defendant's
wrongful act or omission. Those jurisdictions that have considered the issue have
concluded that a cause of action will lie for both post- and preconception acts.
See Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade,
483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1978); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977). See generally, e.g., Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn:
A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 131 (1979); Robertson, Toward
Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Iniuries,
Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 Dun L.J. 1401; Note, Torts
Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 Na. L. REV. 706 (1977);
Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
Noan DAmm L. REv. 349 (1971); Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The
Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SuFFor. L. REv. 582 (1976).
138 435 U.S. 702 (1978). See also text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
139 435 U.S. at 716.
140 Id. 716-17 (footnotes omitted).
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Manhart, however, does not completely dispose of the matter.-
After all, Manhart dealt with the relatively tractable cost of con--
tribution to an employee pension plan. There is perhaps some-
point at which the issue of cost transcends "mere" cost in such a
fashion as to completely undermine the employer's business. Civil
liability for a defective child, for example, could be ruinous for a
small employer. At this point, cost might be considered relevant
as a BFOQ defense.
141
Even if cost were, theoretically, relevant to the BFOQ defense,.
it is unlikely that the employer could justify the exclusion of fer-
tile women, and not fertile men, from the workplace. For one
thing, the potential liability of the employer for the worker's im-
pairment is not determined by the worker's sex. The employer
cannot choose to avoid the cost of liability to a female applicant
(or her unborn) and assume the cost of liability to a male em-
ployee for a similar injury without violating section 703(a)(2) of
title VII.142 Even in those cases in which the toxic substance affects
only the female reproductive system, the employer cannot choose,
among the costs of all injuries faced by his workers, to avoid only
the costs associated with a risk of injury faced by his female appli-
cants or employees.
These arguments aside, it is unlikely that cost as such can or
should ever constitute a BFOQ defense to disparate treatment. The
fact remains that cost of labor in no way affects the employee's literal
ability to perform the job. Basic economic terms such as cost sim-
ply do not mesh neatly with the concept of an occupational
qualification.143 At the moment, then, the best course may be to
take Manhart at its word: explicit, intentional sex discrimination
can never be justified by reference to the employer's costs. The
employer will therefore be unable to defend an exclusion of fertile
women using the BFOQ defense.
b. The Manifest Business Necessity Defense
In contrast to the statutory BFOQ defense, the judicially cre-
ated manifest business necessity defense is available only when an
employer's gender-neutral employment policy is shown to have a
disparate impact on the members of one sex. This defense would
141 And, in fact, the use of the word "impractical" in the current formulation
of the Weeks-Diaz test, see note 121 supra, would suggest some room for a cost-
based BFOQ defense. But see Sirota, supra note 76, at 1052 n.164.
14242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1976).
143 Rather, the idea of cost appears more compatible with the manifest business
necessity defense. See text accompanying notes 159-64 infra.
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be available-if at all-only if the employer demonstrates that the
harmful reproductive effects of occupational exposure to the toxin
are confined to women and their offspring. Any similar effect on
men would render the policy facially discriminatory.
First adopted by the Supreme Court in the race discrimination
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 44 and later applied to sex dis-
crimination in Dothard v. Rawlinson,145 the manifest business neces-
sity defense imposes upon the employer "'the burden of showing
that any given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to
the employment in question.' '"14 6  Furthermore, under the
Dothard formulation, even if the employer proves the requisite
degree of job-relatedness, the plaintiff may rejoin by showing the
availability of other practices or policies "without a similar dis-
criminatory effect [which] would also 'serve the employer's legiti-
mate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship." '14
Under current title VII law, none of the employer's possible justi-
144 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
145 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
146 Id. 329 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
Under the manifest business necessity defense, the employer need not prove
that the protected class, as a class, is unqualified to perform. Thus the employer's
burden under manifest business necessity is somewhat lighter than his burden
under the BFOQ defense.
Some courts have wrongly allowed employers to justify their employment
policies under both the BFOQ and manifest business necessity defenses when only
one defense was appropriate. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458
F. Supp. 474, 495 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam,
633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1981)
(Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076). Clearly, if the employer's policy constitutes disparate
treatment, his justification should be carefully limited to the statutory BFOQ
defense; any more generous treatment by the courts only serves to undermine
title VII.
147Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (in turn quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 801 (1973))).
Some courts prefer a somewhat different formulation of this test:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
the business., Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling
to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would
better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally
well with a lesser differential racial impact.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971), quoted in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371
(4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643
(U.S. Mar. 3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076).
The two tests probably yield like results when applied. A crabbed reading
of the Supreme Court's version, however, might suggest that there exists only one
business interest "sufficiently compelling to override any [sexual] ... impact"-
the employer's interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship."
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fications-health of the female employee, her unborn, or the costs
of following any policy besides one resulting in exclusion 14S-would
likely survive scrutiny under this standard.
(i) Risk of Harm to the Worker
The employer could assert that harm to the female employee's
reproductive system in itself justifies a facially neutral policy that
results in the exclusion of a disproportionate number of women
from employment. As in the context of the BFOQ defense, 149 it
is doubtful that employee health, without more, suffices as an over-
riding legitimate business interest under the manifest business neces-
sity test. Some courts have been reluctant to deem any other
business interest than job performance as an "overriding legiti-
mate" interest under this test. In Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Amer-
ica,1O for example, it was the employer's policy to discharge
employees whose wages were garnished several times. The em-
ployer argued that repeated wage garnishments raised its business
costs and resulted in a loss of business efficiency, thus justifying the
disproportionate effect of the policy on black employees. The dis-
trict court held that
[t]he sole permissible reason for discriminating against
actual or prospective employees involves the individual's
capability to perform the job effectively. This approach
leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience,
annoyance or even expense to the employer. . . . The
ability of the individual effectively and efficiently to carry
out his assigned duties is, therefore, the only justification
recognized by law.151
Certainly, employee health transcends "inconvenience, annoy-
ance or . . . expense." Nonetheless, the same reasoning that was
used to invalidate the employer's policy in Johnson has also been
applied in the context of employee health. In Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc.,152 the employer airline put forth the increased physi-
cal risk to the employee as one reason for not permitting pregnant
flight attendants to fly. Responded the court:
148 See text following note 123 spra.
149 See notes 124-31 supra & accompanying text.
150 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
151 Id. 495-96.
152 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (per criam), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3643 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076).
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Eastern's contention that an element of business neces-
sity is its consideration for the safety of the pregnant flight
attendant . . . is not persuasive. If this personal compas-
sion can be attributed to corporate policy it is commenda-
ble, but in the area of civil rights, personal risk decisions
not affecting business operations are best left to individuals
who are the targets of discrimination.15 3
Thus the question of maternal health is relevant only in so far as
it has a "manifest relationship to the employment in question."
Given the assumption that the workplace health hazard harms only
the reproductive system, this nexus, as argued previously in the
context of disparate treatment analysis,154 would be nearly impos-
sible to establish.1
55
(ii) Risk of Harm to the Unborn
The assertion that the health of the employee's unborn is an
overriding legitimate business interest for the purposes of disparate
impact analysis meets the same fate as the claim respecting the
health of the employee-the purported justification simply has no
legally recognizable relationship to the employer's business, and
thus it can not justify the discrimination. 66 This interest was re-
jected as overriding in In re National Airlines, Inc. Maternity Leave
Practices and Flight Attendant Weight Program Litigation,57 in
which the airline, as in Burwell, sought to exclude pregnant em-
ployees from flight duty. Although the employer's defense failed
for lack of proof that flight duty was hazardous to the health of
the unborn child, the court stated that in any case decisions as to
the health of the fetus belong to the mother, not to the employer 58
153 Id. 371.
I14 See notes 124-31 supra & accompanying text.
155 cf. Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
ff 31,425 (9th Cir. 1980) (nonpregnancy held to be a BFOQ). See note 128
supra.
15 6 See notes 132-35 supra & accompanying text.
257 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
158 Id. 259. See also Burwell, 633 F.2d at 371. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has avoided taking a stance on this issue. See
EEOC Decision No. 75-072, EEOC Dec. It 6442 (1974); EEOC Decision No.
75-055, EEOC Dec. f 6443 (1974). These cases were initiated by pregnant x-ray
technicians who were required by their employers to resign without benefits to
avoid possible injury to their unborn children from exposure to ionizing radiation.
In both decisions, the Commission skirted the question whether preserving the
health of the employees' unborn children is a compelling business purpose but
concluded that, even if the employer could establish that fetal health is a com-
pelling business purpose, that purpose was not so compelling as to justify forcing
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(iii) Cost to the Employer
If Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America 159-which held that job
performance is the only employer interest considered legitimate
under the manifest business necessity test-is limited to its facts, an
employer might succeed in persuading the court that the costs asso-
ciated with nonexclusion make exclusion a manifest business neces-
sity.'10 Those costs would include the expenses incurred if the
employer is held liable for harm to the employee's reproductive
system 161 and possibly to her unborn. 62 Note that these expenses
are not the "incidental" costs generally associated with the elimina-
tion of discrimination, which the employer is required to bear.10
Rather, the liability imposed could be crippling, and, at least for
small businesses, could threaten the employer's immediate solvency
and ongoing profitability. If the relationship between liability and
profitability and/or solvency was sufficiently "manifest," a court
,could hold that the avoidance of such costs by means of an exclu-
sionary policy might be a purpose sufficiently compelling to out-
weigh the policy's discriminatory impact.
6 4
No court has ever accepted such an argument. But even if the
-employer successfully persuades the court of the existence of a cost-
based defense, his victory is likely to be hollow. The plaintiff can
the pregnant women to resign their jobs without benefits when other, more
acceptable alternatives existed.
'59 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
16 0 See generally Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YArE L.J. 98 (1974). But see City
,of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
161 See note 136 supra.
162 See note 137 supra.
163 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978) (pension plan contribution differential); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego
Seh. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1975) (administrative costs), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354,
366 & n.11 (8th Cir. 1973) (training costs); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir.) (costs of altering employment practices, specifically, a
seniority system), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)
(1980) (pension plan costs).
16 4 See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1971)
(dictum); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1980) (costs will be considered as a defense to a
-charge of discrimination against the handicapped to the extent that they impose an
"undue hardship").
One student commentator has suggested that costs that would put the indi-
vidual employer out of business would satisfy the manifest business necessity
defense. See CoLum. Note, supra note 15, at 147, 151-52. But cf. Sirota,
supra note 76, at 1052 n.164 (counselling against a "business failure avoidance"
BFOQ).
The answer that an employer can always buy insurance is an answer, but not
a complete one. The premiums alone could be onerous, especially if the insurance
:ool was small.
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respond by employing the second leg of the Dothard test. She may
posit the existence of less discriminatory alternatives than a policy
of wholesale exclusion. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission accepted such a rejoinder in two cases in which the em-
ployer asserted possible radiation harm to the fetuses of pregnant
x-ray technicians as a justification for terminating pregnant tech-
nicians. 165 "[R]espondent [employer] has failed to show why it
could not have given [the employee] a leave of absence or why she
could not have been allowed to use her sick leave or maternity
benefits." 166
In the context of some chemical hazards, temporary measures
such as these would probably not be sufficient because the harm-
ful effects on the mother may commence before she is pregnant,8 T
and the harmful effects on the fetus may be most pronounced be-
fore the mother is even aware that she is pregnant'6 8 In these situa-
tions, the employer might reduce the concentration of the toxin to
levels at which neither the mother nor her unborn is at risk, or
remove the worker periodically from the toxic environment so that
her body can rid itself of the toxin.6 9
Under current law, it is unlikely that the court would ever
reach the issue of less discriminatory alternatives. As the foregoing
discussion has demonstrated, none of the employer's possible justi-
fications for exclusion-employee health, fetal health, or excessive
cost-constitutes a compelling business interest. Thus-assuming
correct application of title VII-the employer's defense will fail, the
exclusionary policy will be invalidated, and the employee will be
ordered back on the job. No discussion of alternatives will be
necessary. 70
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM
The preceding analysis strictly applied title VII to the issue of
exclusion of fertile women from the workplace. The ineluctable
conclusion of such analysis-that title VII forbids exclusion from the
16 See EEOC Decision No. 75-072, EEOC Dec. V 6442 (1974); EEOC De-
cision No. 75-055, EEOC Dec. ff 6443 (1974).
166 EEOC Decision No. 75-072, EEOC Dec. ff 6442, at 4181 (1974).
167 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra & accompanying text.
168 See note 43 supra & accompanying text.
169 OSHA's lead standards require just such periodic removal. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1025 (1980).
170 The proposal articulated later in this Article, see notes 191-254 infra &
accompanying text, allows exclusion in some limited circumstances. In such cases,
the examination of less discriminatory alternatives becomes a crucial concern.
The subject is discussed at greater length at notes 220-31 infra & accompanying text.
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hazardous workplace-leads, however, to two related problems.
First, faced with the harshness of the result, courts may shy away
from disciplined title VII analysis altogether, and allow the em-
ployer broad power to exclude. Second, even proper application of
current title VII law does not solve the disturbing problem of repro-
ductive hazards in the workplace. Clearly, new standards are thus
required if the courts are to avoid these two pitfalls. The discus-
sibn below illustrates this need for reform.
A. The Temptation to Weaken Title VII
If title VII is correctly applied, the employer will be unable to
justify its refusal to hire fertile or pregnant women, and the suc-
cessful plaintiff will demand relief. The dilemma facing the courts
is that the traditional title VII remedies-reinstatement and back-
pay 171-will eliminate only the unlawful discrimination. They will
not protect mother, father, or future child from health risks asso-
ciated with hazardous substances.
Faced with such a difficult and painful choice, the court may
well forego strict application of title VII and attempt to solve the
overriding health problem by permitting the employer to exclude
women with childbearing capacity. Unwilling to risk reproductive
injury to women, the court may simply ignore or misapply the
principle that the decision as to whether a woman will engage in
dangerous, inconvenient, or unromantic employment belongs to the
woman and not to the employer or the court. 7
2
This is not merely a theoretical concern; even the Supreme
Court has demonstrated substantial difficulty in maintaining a dis-
ciplined analysis when faced with the possibility of sexual harm to
women. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,173 for example, the Court as-
sumed that female prison guards were unable to perform their
duties because of the risk of assault. The opinion reveals the ease
with which the Court can rely upon assumptions about the relative
abilities of women to perform a particular job rather than upon the
factual evidence in the record.
For one thing, there was no evidence in the record beyond the
opinions of male guards and other employees of the defendant that
female guards are more vulnerable to attack and generally less
1
7 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(g) (1976).
172 See text accompanying notes 130-31 supra.
173 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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effective than are male guards.174 Second, even assuming the vulner-
ability of some women to sexual attack, the majority opinion points
to no evidence that all (or substantially all) women would be so
incapacitated as to be unable to perform. Instead of assessing the
individual female's abilities, the Dothard majority found that the
plaintiff's "very womanhood" so increased the likelihood of an
assault that it undermined her ability to maintain prison security.'7
The Dothard case is admittedly distinguishable from cases in-
volving the exclusion of fertile women from employment. The
risk of reproductive harm, unlike the risk of assault, is not even
arguably related to job performance. Dothard is telling, nonethe-
less, for it suggests that the taboos and stereotypes still inherent
in our society can too easily be invoked to erode title VII and the
policy of nondiscrimination.
The dangers that would attend such an inappropriate legal
analysis under title VII are many. The vitality and cohesiveness
of sex discrimination law would be ill-served by the creation of
bad law in this highly technical and newly emerging area. Perhaps
most important, if the employer is permitted to avoid the pos-
sibility of adverse pregnancies by refusing to hire fertile woman
workers, he effectively escapes his statutory obligation to maintain
a safe workplace. The employer thus avoids both the duty to pro-
vide equal employment opportunities and the concurrent duty,
under the OSH Act, 70 to implement technologies that assure a
workplace free from recognized hazards.
B. The Nagging Dilemma: Protecting the Unborn
Unfortunately, even a correct and disciplined resolution of
the legal issues that arise under title VII does not solve the dis-
turbing problem of reproductive hazards in the workplace. The
guarantee of equal employment opportunity embodied in title VII
prohibits employers from excluding only women workers from
employment because of their capacity to bear children. There is
nothing wrong with this result as long as the employer is expected
to eliminate the hazard in question as well as cease the discrimina-
174 Id. 342-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The success of other states in employ-
ing female guards in male facilities was dismissed. Id. 341 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Nor does the majority mention the adequacy of training in self-defense and
assertiveness for female guards.
176 Id. 336.
17029 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976) provides: "Each employer shall furnish to each
of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees" (emphasis added).
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tion against women. The problem arises when elimination of the
hazard to women or their offspring is not a legal or practical pos-
sibility. In these cases, the employer would be required to hire
workers for jobs posing a substantial risk to their reproductive
health or the health of their unborn without being under any com-
mensurate legal duty to eliminate the hazard. 17
Some may argue that this is an acceptable price to pay for the
removal of all sex-related barriers to employment. They may
assert that it is romantic paternalism to attempt to protect women
from health risks, no matter how grave.178 Further, the fact that
the health of unborn children is involved only injects an emotional
element that re-enforces stereotypes of women as mothers; 179 it
adds nothing new to the legal equation because individuals have
a constitutional right to decide questions relating to procreation.180
If the employee wishes to shoulder the risk of harm to herself or
her child, that is no one's business but her own.' 8 '
These points, taken individually, are valid as far as they go.
They do not, however, demonstrate satisfactorily that any employee
has the right to assume the risk of fetal as well as personal injury.
Women and men should certainly retain their right to assume the
risks of dangerous or hazardous employment. But when fetal
health is implicated, sex-based discrimination may well be ex-
cusable. Given the social and economic costs of producing and
caring for defective children and the substantial likelihood that the
employment of workers in unhealthful environments will result
in the birth of such children, 82 it is justifiable to exclude some
members of one sex from a very narrow class of industries in order
to prevent this outcome-as long as the exclusion is in fact narrowly
tailored, objectively applied, and based upon credible scientific
evidence.
Of course, as demonstrated earlier,ess the interest in fetal health
does not fall within the class of business purposes currently recog-
177 Such a duty, if it arises at all, would arise under the OSH Act, and not
under title VII. But see notes 57-66 supra & accompanying text.
178 See text accompanying notes 129-31 & note 131 supra.
i79 In one author's words, the "perpetual pregnancy myth." J. STmA,
supra note 16, at 178.
18 0 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
181 See COLum. Note, supra note 15, at 133-35; Letter from Joan E. Bertin,
Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, to the Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, at 4 (Sept. 12,
1980).
18 2 See Furnish, supra note 15, at 66 & n.13.
183 See notes 132-35 and 156-58 supra & accompanying text.
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nized by the courts as justifications for sex discrimination under
title VII. The interest is, instead, a public interest in the healthy
and normal development of an unborn fetus.18 It may be argued
that the employer may not take on the mantle of the state in pro-
tecting the unborn child; 18 and that, even assuming the employer's
power to protect the fetus, the employee's right to his or her job
overrides any interest in the fetus, at least until the point of via-
bility.
Admittedly, neither of these arguments can lightly be dis-
missed. But when all the interests are placed in the balance-the
employee's interest in a healthful work environment and equal
employment opportunity, the state's interest in fetal health, and the
employer's interest in maintaining a profitable enterprise-the an-
swer becomes clear: the state should not compel the employer,
through title VII, to hire women or men if the safety of their un-
born cannot reasonably be assured.
Businesses should be encouraged to make socially responsible
business decisions. The concept of corporate social responsibility,186
although not fully developed in the law, certainly has a place when
the employer's only choices may be to exclude the worker, risk de-
fective births, or close down his operation. In this situation, the
employer's interest in avoiding the cost of liability-coupled with
the very high social and human costs incurred when children are
born defective-serves both his business and the public interest
187
Taken separately, none of these interests would suffice as a defense
under title VII. Taken together, the merely legitimate business
184n Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court recognized the
state's compelling interest in protecting fetal health, but only in the third trimester
of pregnancy when the fetus is said to be viable. Id. 163. Before that point,
the mother's right to privacy is paramount and the state may act only to preserve
the mother's health. Id.
1a5Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), defined the power of the state, not
private parties, to restrict a woman's right to an abortion.
186The subject of corporate social responsibili has engendered lively debate
in recent years. See, e.g., CowMmrxx FOR EcONOwc DEvELOpMENT, Soctor. RE-
spoNsmrrEs oF BusNEss COIU'ORAuoNs (1971); SocL&L RESPoNsiBmrY AND =nr
Busnmss PEXDICAMENT (J. McKie ed. 1974); Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Symposium, 30 HAs-rNs L.J. 1247 (1979); Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Cor-
porate Democracy: Control of Investment Managers" Voting on Social Responsi-
bility Proxy Issues, 93 HAnv. L. REv. 670 (1980); Engel, An Approach to Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1979); Mundheim, A Comment
on the Social Responsibilities of Life Insurance Companies as Investors, 61 VA.
L. RFv. 1247 (1975).
187 In contrast, the employer's interest in avoiding the expenses required to
clean up the workplace-though admittedly a business purpose related to profit-
ability-is not accompanied by the social and human costs of defective births.
Thus, unlike avoiding the cost of liability, avoiding the cost of clean-up (or other
safety measures) is not an interest sufficiently overriding to justify an exclusionary
policy.
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purpose, accompanied by compelling public interests, should suc-
ceed in making out the claim of an overriding interest necessary
to justify an exclusionary policy under title VII.188
The ability of the employer to justify exclusion by asserting
both business and public interests does not, of course, end the in-
quiry. The mother's rights, both statutory and constitutional, must
also be considered. Clearly, the mother's statutory right to non-
discriminatory employment decisions-like her constitutional right
to privacy-is not absolute.189 At some point, her interests can be
subordinate to the important public interest in the healthy and
normal development of an unborn fetus.19° A similar analysis ap-
plies to males whose offspring would be damaged by parental ex-
posure to hazardous chemicals. In either case, a distinction can
and should be drawn between the individual's right to terminate
a pregnancy or make other decisions relating to reproduction and
the right knowingly to risk a defective birth while subjecting a
third party to liability for the defects.
Thus, there are indeed situations in which a discriminatory
employment practice may be justified by risk of harm to the unborn.
The next task is to determine in what circumstances this may be
true, and craft a legal standard that will yield the correct result.
V. BEYOND TITLE VII AND OSHA: A PROPOSAL
FOR CHANGE
A. General Considerations
An analysis of the pertinent public policy issues leads to the
reluctant conclusion that sex-based discrimination in employment
188 This view is consistent with the reasoning in Spurlock v. United Air Lines,
475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), in which very high social and human costs raised
a merely legitimate business purpose to the level of an overriding legitimate pur-
pose. Generally, the federal courts have been more receptive to employer defenses
based upon the health and safety of third parties, see New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Worthy v. United States Steel
Corp., 616 F.2d 698, 701 (3d Cir. 1980); Spurlock, 475 F.2d at 219, than to
defenses based upon a threat to the safety or health of the employee herself. See
text accompanying notes 129-31 supra. Courts may be equally solicitous of fetal
health.
Admittedly, in the cases discussed above, the class of persons that the em-
ployer has been permitted to protect consists primarily of consumers of the
employer's product, see, e.g., Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (subway riders);
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7 31,425 (9th Cir.
1980) (airline passengers); Spurlock, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (airline
passengers). Protecting such a class is consistent with an employer's business
interest, as that term is narrowly defined. Nonetheless, at least one court has talked
in terms of protection of the "general public." Worthy, 616 F.2d at 701 (dictum).
189 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190 Id. 163.
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may in some circumstances be justified by the possibility of work-
place harm to the unborn. It is clear, however, that current title
VII law does not allow for such discrimination in any circumstances.
The next task of this Article is to propose changes in the current
state of sex discrimination law that will fairly balance the competing
interests involved.
A review of the relevant legislation suggests how these various
interests should be weighted. The enactment of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 9.1 reflects the judgment of the Con-
gress that the marketplace does not adequately and equitably
distribute the risks to worker safety and health. Similarly, the pas-
sage of tide VII 192 demonstrates that Congress believed that pre-
vailing market forces would not eliminate discrimination in em-
ployment. Further, both acts establish the expense of eliminating
discrimination and the maintenance of a healthful work environ-
ment as costs of doing business. Therefore-consistent with the
spirit both of title VII and the OSH Act 93-the proposal outlined
here emphasizes that the worker's interests in a safe and nondis-
criminatory employment are matters of public policy and, as such,
weigh more heavily in the balance than the employer's private inter-
est in business profitability.
Thus, although the major policy judgment required here bal-
ances the worker's interest in nondiscriminatory employment deci-
sions against the unborn child's healthy development, the practical
conflict is between worker safety and the employer's business profit-
ability. The proposal offered here provides a compromise that
favors both parties. Relying upon judicial modification of the ju-
dicially created manifest business necessity defense, the proposal
expands the defense to recognize a compelling business purpose in
the avoidance of a substantial risk of prenatal injury to the worker's
unborn child-a defense to the title VII claim that presently does not
exist. The proposal also limits the applicability of the manifest busi-
ness necessity defense in the case of fetally toxic work environments
to cases in which the employer cannot protect the unborn child
through methods other than the exclusion of susceptible workers.
Two factors complicate the development of a sound legal
scheme. The first is primarily practical and concerns the possibility
191 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976,
Supp. II 1978 & Supp. HI 1979)).
192 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- to
20OO0e-17 (1976 & Supp. m 1979)).
193 Cf. 3 J. SuTHER .. , STATUTEs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01
(4th ed. C. Sands 1974) (remedial statutes should be broadly construed to effec-
tuate their beneficent statutory purpose).
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of jurisdictional conflicts between the federal courts and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC).1
94
The federal courts are presumably not as competent as OSHRC to
make determinations concerning workplace safety, which involve
complex factual and policy judgments requiring a high degree of
scientific expertise and familiarity with the realities of the work-
place.195 Similarly, the corps of administrative law judges that ad-
ministers the OSH Act has no jurisdiction respecting and is not
necessarily competent to pass judgment on questions of discrimina-
tion and title VII law "9 -generally the bailiwick of the federal
courts. 97 Any proposed scheme must take into account these dif-
ficult problems of variant jurisdiction and expertise.
Further complicating the development of a workable legal
scheme is the emotional nature of the problem, which involves ques-
tions of maternal health and pregnancy. Society remains burdened
with many sexual myths concerning the fragility of the female rela-
tive to the male, her propensity and desire to become pregnant,
and her inability to make rational decisions concerning her own
wellbeing.198 Saddled with these stereotypes, it will take an extraor-
dinary effort by any federal judge to achieve the degree of judicial
impartiality necessary for a principled and just decision.
B. A Modest Proposal
1. The "Easy" Cases
There are two cases in which the problem of sex-based discrim-
ination to protect the health of the employee or his or her unborn
is readily resolvable under existing legal doctrines. First, consider
the case of disparate treatment, in which the employer specifically
and overtly excludes or discriminates against one sex or a subclass
thereof. Such overt discrimination is not justifiable under existing
title VII law,' 99 and there is no reason why existing law should be
194 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
195 See Marshall v. Cities Service Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1978);
Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf. 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(a) (1976) (OSHA findings of fact, "if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive").
196 For example, the administrative law judge who heard the first OSHA com-
plaint involving sexual discrimination in the workplace justified by disparately
hazardous working conditions, see Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co,
OSHRC Docket No. 79-5762 (July 15, 1980), demonstrated a marked reluctance
to entangle himself in the discrimination question. See id. 8-11; note 57 supra.
197 See 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(f) (3) (1976).
198 See notes 172-75 supra & accompanying text.
199 See notes 87-105 supra & accompanying text.
[VoL 129:798
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN THE WORKPLACE
altered. Even when the exclusion of some workers is necessary to
protect their health, an employer should be required to adopt a
gender-neutral practice or policy. Thus, while an employer could
never tell a female applicant that he never hires women who are
capable of bearing children, he may be able lawfully to exclude
all individuals whose progeny would be seriously harmed by ex-
posure to the hazardous workplace.23
The second "easy" case arises when the employer discriminates
to protect workers from a workplace hazard that should, in com-
pliance with the OSH Act, be eliminated or reduced. Obviously,
an employer should not be permitted to use a violation of the law
as a rationale for prima facie illegal discrimination. He should be
required to comply with his duties under the OSH Act, in which
instance the purported justification for exclusion no longer exists.
This "easy" case is more readily stated in theory than imple-
mented in practice. Optimally, such a case would begin with an
employee-discriminatee's complaint with the Department of Labor
alleging the violation of an OSH Act duty.201 The complaint would
result in an inspection of the employer's premises and a citation for
violation of a specific regulation or the general duty clause. The
citation might be contested before OSHRC and eventually liti-
gated before a federal appellate court.202
If the citation survives judicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny, the
discriminatee could use any relevant final determination against the
employer in a subsequent title VII suit. Preferably, the determina-
tion would have collateral estoppel effect.2 0 3 If so, summary dis-
200 Cf. Guidelines, supra note 9, at § 2(a).
Admittedly, such a bright line distinction between disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment cases seems somewhat artificial in the current context. Although
a policy having a disparate impact on women workers may be cast in neutral
terms, it is highly likely that the employer will be fully aware of the disparate
effect. Nonetheless, the distinction exists in the current law, and is defensible as
a policy matter. A facially neutral policy is not as insulting and apparently
arbitrary to the discriminatee class as an overtly discriminatory one. Furthermore,
if an employer in good faith attempts to formulate a neutral policy, he will be
forced to careflly consider and define those classes of individuals that may
justifiably be excluded. This may in turn lead to less unjustifiable discrimination.
201 See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
202 Of course, OSHRC has neither the competence nor jurisdiction to determine
the merits of the discrimination component of the employee's claim. See note 57
supra.
203 The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been extended to the decisions of
administrative agencies in appropriate cases. United States v. Utah Constr. &
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). See Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect
of Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L.
Rv. 65 (1977). The Seventh Circuit has stated that "issue preclusion applies to
a final administrative determination of an issue properly before an agency acting
in a judicial capacity when both parties were aware of the possible significance of
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position of the title VII question would be the likely result, as in
most cases the discriminatory impact of the employer's policy will
be lightly contested. If not, the OSHA-level disposition could be
given whatever evidentiary weight that the fact finder deemed it
merited.2
04
A different case arises when an aggrieved employee or applicant
sues in federal court under title VII without the benefit of an
OSHRC disposition, but nonetheless alleges that the employer is in
violation of his duties under the OSH Act. A resolution of the
OSH Act question is tempting even without specific guidance from
OSHA, as this will as a practical matter often decide the case.
But an argument can be made that a federal court is without juris-
diction to decide an issue of worker health not passed upon by
OSHA. After all, OSHRC is vested with nearly exclusive original
jurisdiction to compel compliance with its standards.205 In addi-
tion, OSHRC has the expertise to make rational and consistent
determinations on issues of employee safety and health.206
This argument, though not without merit, can be carried too
far. Just as OSHA bears primary responsibility for deciding ques-
tions of workplace health and safety, federal courts bear the burden
of resolving problems of discrimination under title VII.207 Merely
the issue in later proceedings and were afforded a fair opportunity to litigate the
issue and to obtain judicial review." Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1322
(7th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted). Under this test, it would appear reasonable to
permit a plaintiff to make offensive use in a title VII suit of a determination by
OSHRC that an employer was in violation of the OSH Act. See Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
2 04 Cf. Arthur v. Flota Mercante Gran Centro Americana S.A., 487 F.2d 561,
564 (5th Cir. 1973) (violation of safety and health regulations is negligence per se
in some circumstances); Buhler v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 999, 1000
(E.D. La. 1974) (evidence that OSHA standards have been violated admissible to
prove negligence). See also Guidelines, supra note 9, at §2(d)(2) (making
employer compliance with the OSH Act a relevant factor in determining whether
an effectively sex-based discriminatory practice is justified); id. at §2(d)(8)(iv)
(establishing a presumption that an employer who is not in compliance with the
OSH Act has not considered all available alternatives to a policy that effectively
discriminates on the basis of sex).
20529 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976) (granting the employer the right to a hearing
before OSHRC to contest a citation). OSHRC determinations are, of course,
reviewable in the federal circuit courts. See 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1976). Further-
more, the federal district courts may entertain actions for injunctive relief brought
by the Secretary of Labor (or, if the Secretary arbitrarily refuses to seek such
relief, by any employee at risk) to correct practices or procedures posing an
imminent and substantial danger of serious physical harm to employees. 29 U.S.C.
§662(a) & (d) (1976).
206 See note 195 supra & accompanying text.
207 In fact, OSHRC may have no jurisdiction whatsoever to decide discrimina-
tion-related issues. See note 57 supra.
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because a question of employee health is bound up with a claim of
employment discrimination does not mean that the courts should
abdicate all responsibility for deciding the title VII claim. Rather,
the issue requires some standard by which the courts can evaluate
the employer's worker safety justification without usurping OSHA's
jurisdiction or moving too far beyond the courts' expertise.
Certainly, there will be some cases in which the scientific evi-
dence is so clear that no particular expertise or industrial experi-
ence is necessary to determine whether the employer can or should
reduce the risk to worker safety or health. In such cases, the pri-
mary reason for deferring to OSHA would not exist. If a court
can affirmatively and comfortably hold that an employer is "clearly
avoiding" a duty imposed upon him by the OSH Act, then there is
no reason why the court should not do S0.203 In those cases in
which the evidence on the issues is not so clear, or an OSHA pro-
ceeding is in process, the court may exercise its discretion to delay
the title VII proceeding until the plaintiff seeks or obtains redress
through OSHA. Otherwise, there is no reason why a title VII
claimant should have to wait for OSHA's involved administrative
machinery to turn before seeking vindication of his or her title VII
rights.20
9
2. The "Harder" Case
A harder case arises when an employer seeks to justify other-
wise invidious discrimination by reference to a workplace hazard
from which he is under no clear OSH Act duty to protect his em-
ployees. Such a case would most likely arise when the toxic effects
of a widely used or newly introduced chemical are just coming to
light, or alternatively, when OSHA has not addressed a specific
hazard. In such circumstances either no OSHA standard will
208 Fact finders in common law negligence cases have been permitted to deter-
mine whether or not an OSH Act duty has been breached. See, e.g., Knight v.
Burns, Kirkley & Williams Const. Co., 331 So. 2d 651, 654 (Ala. 1976); Disabatino
Bros. v. Baio, 366 A.2d 508, 510-11 (Del. 1976).
2 09 The obvious procedural difficulties outlined here highlight the fact that
private title VII litigation cannot provide the necessary systematic approach to the
problem of reproductive hazards in the workplace. Ultimately, the EEOC and
OSHA-perhaps in conjunction with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP), which can recommend the withholding of government con-
tracts for violations of federal employment standards, see Exec. Order No. 11,246,
§ 209(a), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
at 1234 (1976)--should develop a schedule by which the government institutes an
industry-by-industry challenge of the practice of excluding fertile women. Although
the process would be slow, the primary advantage of such a scheme would be to
allow government charges of discrimination to track OSHA's development of data
and standards for each toxic substance.
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apply2 10 or the chemical health hazard is not likely to be "rec-
ognized" under the OSH Act's general duty clause.
211
The court will be unable to make short shrift of the employer's
defense by pointing to a clear breach of duty under the OSH Act.
In fact, neither OSHA nor OSHRG can play a direct role here
because there is no breach of the Act. Nonetheless, the court faces
a claim of discrimination, and must resolve it. Without a clear
policy directive from OSHA, the court's disposition of the dis-
crimination claim must be tied to title VII alone. Analogies may
be drawn and concepts borrowed, but that is the extent of OSHA's
relevance.
Of course, the "harder" case becomes relatively easy if the
plaintiff can prove pretext.21 2 For example, the plaintiff may
demonstrate the existence of a health risk to the opposite sex as
substantial as that to the plaintiff's sex, which the employer has
done nothing about.213  Certainly it would be suspicious that the
employer's supposed beneficence is selectively applied "in favor"
of the discriminatee's sex. More difficult to prove, but equally
effective as a showing of pretext, would be the fact that the employer
has protected the unexcluded sex from a similarly substantial risk
by means less drastic than the means advanced (and perhaps re-
jected as unavailable) in the case at bar. Either way, an inference
arises that the employer is motivated against the adversely affected
sex, or at least, recklessly or unreasonably disregards a substantial
risk of harm to the other sex. In either case, the sexes are being
subjected to unequal treatment, and the plaintiff makes out a case
of pretext.
210 See notes 58-59 supra & accompanying text.
2 11 See notes 50-51 supra & accompanying text.
212 Pretext is usually thought of in terms of a disparate treatment analysis. See
text accompanying note 75 supra. However, it has a place in disparate impact
analysis as well. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 372
& n.18 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar.
3, 1981) (Nos. 80-868 & 80-1076). The notion of pretext serves as a bridge
linking the two legal theories-if the plaintiff in a disparate impact case proves
pretext, she or he has really transformed the case back into the disparate treatment
mold.
21 A major flaw of the proposed and withdrawn guidelines, see note 9 supra,
is their limited attention to the problem of pretext. The guidelines focus ex-
clusively on the employer's policies respecting the relative risks of "reproductive
hazards" faced by the excluded and the unexcluded workers and not on other
health hazards. By contrast, the proposal offered here does not distinguish be-
tween reproductive hazards and other health hazards of the workplace. The pro-
posal focuses, rather, on the employer's treatment of all workplace hazards. For
example, an employer's entire workforce may face a significant risk of cancer, while
fertile women face the only risk of significant reproductive injury. The employer
could not, under the proposal, justify a discriminatory policy by claiming that a
risk of reproductive injury cannot be tolerated, while the cancer risk remains.
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The difficulties inherent in the "harder" case arise when the
plaintiff is unable to prove pretext. Current title VII law is simply
not adequate to resolve such cases. As presently interpreted, title
VII flatly forbids exclusion-even if there is no showing of pretext
and the toxic chemical is shown to be extremely hazardous to the
employee's unborn children. Thus, it is proposed that after the em-
ployee has proved a prima facie case of impact discrimination, the
employer may justify the discriminatory practice by proving that,
but for the discrimination, the health of the employee's unborn
children would be substantially and unreasonably at risk, and that
no less discriminatory alternatives are available to reduce the risk
to acceptable levels. 214
The first point to emphasize concerns the nature of the risk.
It must be so "substantial" as to exceed a threshold degree of harm.
Thus, injury must result in permanent or serious temporary im-
pairment that affects normal functioning. The risk must also be
"unreasonable" such that the interests of the worker in being gain-
fully employed and free from discrimination do not outweigh the
social interest in maintaining the health of the worker's unborn
child. If the risk is neither substantial nor unreasonable, the em-
ployer would not be permitted to exclude.
A word must be said concerning the nature of the evidence
needed for an employer to prove the substantiality and unreason-
ableness of a workplace risk. Such evidence will be the product of
scientific research. As a body of facts from which rational infer-
ences may be drawn, scientific research is fraught with dangers
215
Thus, the court should be particularly demanding in evaluating
the admissibility and use of such evidence. Admittedly, scientific
evidence of long-term hazardous effects is rarely a certain predic-
tor.216 Nonetheless, the evidence must give rise to a clear inference
that the alleged harm predicted is likely to arise with the alleged
frequency and within the allegedly endangered worker population.
214 This is not to imply that the employer would no longer have available to
him the usual manifest business necessity defense. See text accompanying notes
144-48 supra. Thus, if a workplace hazard directly affected the physical capacity
of one sex to perform the job but did not adversely affect the other sex, a dis-
criminatory practice affecting only one sex may be justifiable.
215 See notes 42-43 supra & accompanying text.
216 Cf. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 293 (D.
Del. 1980) (court, upon being asked to predict the impact on the delivery of
health-care service to minority groups caused by the future relocation of a major
urban medical center, termed itself "unwillingly cast ... into the role of a modem
day Nostradamus").
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The evidence must also be "reputable." 217 Not only must the court
be satisfied that the research methodology is sound, but also that
it is untainted by conscious or unconscious sexual bias. Thus, a
study of the hazardous effects of a substance involving the mem-
bers of only one sex would be accorded very little weight.218 In-
deed, the slight probative value of such evidence would render the
evidence inadmissible on the factual issue whether members of one
sex are subject to a health risk that differentiates them from other
workers.
219
The employer who proves the existence of a real and substan-
tial health threat must still rebut any claim by the plaintiff that
less discriminatory alternatives exist to serve the interest in worker
safety. Such other available alternatives would include cleaning
up the workplace or otherwise protecting the endangered employees.
Although cleaning up the workplace may be an undertaking
qualitatively different from the remedies and employer require-
ments usually associated with title VII, it is not conceptually out
of bounds with title VII law.220 Title VII defendants have been
ordered to revamp entirely their job testing and training procedures
in order to eliminate racial impact discrimination.221 Municipali-
ties have been required to make major changes in their transporta-
tion systems 222 in order to comply with the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,223 a statute in many ways analogous to title VII.2 4 Nor does
217 Cf. Guidelines, supra note 9, at §2(d)(3) (requiring the employer to
present "reputable" scientific evidence to justify a discriminatory employment
practice). The guidelines do not define the term "reputable" but do require
scientific research undertaken by the employer in order to support a temporary
exclusion to be conducted "according to accepted scientific methods." Id.
§3(b)(2).
2 1 8 See note 42 supra & accompanying text. Cf. Guidelines, supra note 9, at
§§2(d)(3), 3(b)(2) (requiring employer investigation and research into the
effects of any reproductive hazard on the non-excluded sex).
219But see Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320, 326 n.4 (N.D.
Ohio 1979), in which the court seemed prepared to permit justification of a sex-
based exclusionary policy on the basis of an incomplete scientific record. If such
evidence were instead inadmissible, and "reputable," balanced scientific research
were required, employers may be motivated to do or cause to be done thorough
and unbiased research-a worthwhile by-product of the strict evidentiary standard.220 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-64 (1976).
22-1 E.g., United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 942 n.11 (4th Cir.
1980) (personnel record keeping); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d
387, 395-98 (2d Cir. 1973) (employment tests); United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1973) (hiring practices); 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1980) (Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures).
222 See Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp.
226 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
22329 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
-2 4 The portions of the Rehabilitation Act and its associated regulations dealing
with discrimination look in many ways like a codification of title VII common law
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the existence of the OSH Act indicate otherwise. There is nothing
in the 0SH Act to suggest that it preempts the field of occupational
safety and health from the reach of other federal statutes. 2 5  In
short, there is no conceptual reason why an employer could not be
required under title VII to eliminate a health risk in the work-
place.
Of course, the employer might have a colorable defense here
if the clean-up measures would be very expensive. Although no
court has articulated a precise standard for determining when cost
becomes prohibitive, at some point cost will render the proposed
alternative "unavailable" to the employer. The question is where
that line should be drawn.
The measure of the availability of an appropriate alternative
falls somewhere between de minimis cost and prohibitive cost.
Clearly, it is unreasonable to burden the employer with an alter-
native policy that all but bankrupts his business. Imposition of
such a burden would not only ignore the employer's legitimate
interest in business profitability, but would also force him to forego
the elimination of other health risks in the workplace and the de-
mands of corporate social responsibility in other areas.226
It is appropriate, however, to require the employer to investi-
gate and to adopt protective measures that, while not unduly bur-
densome, do impose substantial costs or other burdens on the
business. After all, the public policy objectives served here-
as it would apply to handicapped persons. Discrimination against "qualified
handicapped individuals" in all private and public programs receiving federal
financial assistance is forbidden. Id. § 794. Federal contractors may be required
to take affirmative action to employ and to promote "qualified handicapped indi-
viduals." Id. § 793.
Handicapped individuals may not be excluded from employment or from a
covered program if capable of performing the "essential functions" of the job with
"reasonable accommodation." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1980). "Reasonable
accommodation may include: (1) making facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usabe [sic] by handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions." Id.
§84.12(b). Employment selection criteria must be "job-related," and the em-
ployer, in order to exclude a handicapped person, must demonstrate that the
handicap impedes the worker's present ability to perform the job. Id. § 84.13,
84.14. Financial costs and expenses associated with accommodation may permit the
employer to forego his duties under the Act only if they create "undue hardship"
for that individual employer. See id. § 84.12(a), (c), 84 app. A. subpt. B. at
357-58.
2 25 0n the contrary, the OSH Act does not "apply to working conditions of
employees with respect to which other Federal agencies . . . exercise statutory
authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational
safety or health." 29 U.S.C. §653(b)(1) (1976). See generally Comment,
Interpreting OSHA's Pre-emption Clause: Farmworkers as a Case Study, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 1509 (1980).
2 26 See note 186 supra & accompanying text.
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elimination of both discrimination and the risk of fetal harm-are
highly regarded. Congress and the courts have mandated that the
expense of eliminating discrimination from employment is a cost
of doing business and that the employer cannot expect his duties
under title VII to be cost-free. 227 Similarly, Congress has imposed
upon employers the often substantial costs of compliance with the
OSH Act.228 Thus, in the case at hand, an alternative employment
policy should be considered "available" if the cost of the alterna-
tive policy will not create an undue financial hardship for the
employer and if the necessary technology is within the employer's
reach or can be readily developed.
The "unduly burdensome" standard is admittedly vague, and
neither Congress nor the courts has articulated any more precise
parameters. Some guidance may be found in the test validation
cases, in which employers have been required to bear the substan-
tial cost of validating and implementing new employment tests.22 9
Analogies can also be drawn to the Rehabilitation Act,23 0 which
requires compliance unless the employer can demonstrate "undue
hardship." 2 31 In both areas, employers have been expected to bear
far more than merely incidental costs. The upper limit of their
potential burden, however, has not been established. That task can
only be accomplished on a case-by-case basis in the courts.
If the court finds that the employer could obviate the need for
a discriminatory practice by reducing or eliminating the hazard,
the employer's defense fails, and the court should order not only
an end to the exclusionary practice, but also prompt implementa-
tion of the less discriminatory measures. Only if no less discrimi-
natory alternatives exist-and only if the evidence has clearly and
convincingly established that any other policy would expose the
unborn children of members of one sex to a substantial and unrea-
sonable risk of harm-can the exclusionary policy stand. Even then,
the court may stipulate that the employer undertake additional
research or develop new technology, which in time might eliminate
the need for the discriminatory policy.
One intimidating problem still looms. Any such discrimina-
tory employer policy would, of course, have to be narrowly tailored
to disadvantage only those individuals who were subject to the
:
22 7 See Robinson v. Lorilard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799-800 (4th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
=8 See note 47 supra.
2 2 9 See note 221 supra & accompanying text.
2 30 See notes 222-24 supra & accompanying text.
231 See note 224 supra & accompanying text.
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health risk. Thus, a narrowly and properly tailored exclusion
would not affect workers who are infertile whether naturally or
by reason of surgical sterilization. The very difficult issue is
whether an employee or applicant should be able to remove herself
or himself from the class of excludable workers by submitting to a
voluntary surgical sterilization.23 2
It is arguable that the decision whether to lose the job or to
be sterilized should be left to the individual worker. An equally
compelling argument can be made that the employer should not
be allowed by the court to impose sterilization as a condition for
employment.
Frankly, neither choice is satisfactory. It would be most un-
fortunate if new research or technology made such "voluntary"
operations unnecessary after workers had submitted to them. And
public policy dictates that such drastic measures not be required
in exchange for a weekly paycheck. In practical terms, however,
it would be virtually impossible for the employer to distinguish
those applicants who were sterilized in order to get the job from
those who were sterilized for any other reason. Even if this prac-
tical difficulty could be solved, the more pressing legal and ethical
problems remain. On balance, the spirit of title VII-maximiza-
tion of worker choice-leads to the uncomfortable conclusion that
the decision be left to the individual employee.
3. The "Hardest" Case
The hardest case arises when OSHA has affirmatively decided
that the employer is in compliance with the OSH Act even though
there exists in the workplace a toxin that is dangerous to fetal
health. It is arguable that for a court to require the employer
to take protective measures would mean that the court was second-
guessing OSHA.
Compliance with the OSH Act, however, is not necessarily a
defense to a title VII claim. Although they appear similar, the
worker safety issues in the OSHA proceeding and in the title VII
litigation are substantively different issues.
The first obvious difference is that OSHRC may dismiss an
OSHA citation for technical reasons, such as statutory time limita-
tions,233 which have no bearing on the existence of a workplace
232 For a discussion of the American Cyanamid case, in which such steriliza-
tion actually occurred, see notes 241-54 infra & accompanying text; note 11 supra.
233 "No citation may be issued ... after the expiration of six months following
the occurrence of any violation:' 29 U.S.C. § 658(c) (1976).
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hazard.2 3 The second obvious difference is that OSHA applies
an industry-wide standard when determining the required degree
of safety within the workplace,23 5 while title VII inquires whether
the individual employer can achieve his purpose of worker safety
through means other than the challenged discriminatory practice.
Even though there may be no violation of the OSH Act, title
VII requires the employer to adopt and implement available al-
ternative practices if he can thus avoid disadvantaging a dispro-
portionate number of workers of one sex. The availability of an
alternative, less discriminatory policy remains a factual issue in
the title VII litigation even though the employer is not in violation
of the OSH Act. When the title VII defendant is an atypical em-
ployer within an industry, he may have a greater financial or
technological capacity to reduce the health risks to his employees
than has the average employer within the same industry. Title
VII may require such an employer to implement safety measures
that the OSH Act does not require.
The third, less obvious, difference is that OSHA is required
to include a cost-benefit analysis in its formulation of exposure
levels and other measures of worker safety.238 Title VII imposes
no similar affirmative duty upon the court. Further, reduction
of the risk to fetal health is but a secondary goal of title VII in the
present case. The primary goal is to reduce the discriminatory
impact of the challenged practice. Title VII may well require
the employer to take additional measures to preserve the employ-
ment rights of the otherwise excluded workers. These may range
from temporary medical removals of longer duration than is re-
quired under an OSHA standard to permanent reassignment of
at-risk employees or more sophisticated safety technologies.
Finally, the findings of an earlier judicial proceeding will not
have collateral estoppel effect against a party to a subsequent pro-
ceeding who was not a party to the earlier proceeding.237 Unlike
the OSHA proceeding, the title VII litigation involves a private
action by a plaintiff whose personal interest in back pay, reinstate-
ment, or other equitable remedies may cause a more rigorous or
differently focused litigation of the relevant factual issues. The
defendant employer may not, therefore, estop the plaintiff from
2 3 4 But see M. RoTmSrmN, supra note 44, at § 400 ("[Tihe Commission has
maintained the policy that cases should be heard on the merits and should not be
decided on threshold procedural issues.").
235 .See note 47 supra.
236 Id.
2 37 See RFSTAThMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent Draft No. 1, 1973).
[Vol. 129:798
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN THE WORKPLACE
litigating the factual issues regarding worker health and available
alternative practices on the basis of the results of an earlier ad-
ministrative proceeding to which the plaintiff was not a party, how-
ever relevant the earlier findings.
Certainly, if the OSHA disposition resulted from a finding
that health risks in the employer's workplace are insufficient to
trigger an OSH Act duty, the court should be made aware that the
employer's assertion that a substantial risk justifies a discriminatory
policy contradicts his position in the earlier proceeding. In that
case, the OSHA finding and the employer's arguments in support
thereof could be introduced by the plaintiff against the employer
to establish that the risk asserted by the employer as a title VII
justification is insubstantial or does not exist. Such contradictory
factual claims would be good evidence that the policy is a pretext
for sex discrimination.
Thus, an affirmative decision by OSHA that the employer is
in compliance with OSHA duties should not determine the out-
come under title VII. As in any other case in which an earlier
proceeding may have resolved the same issues, the court should
review the OSHRC findings to determine whether the same factual
issues formed the basis of the OSHA findings as. are at igsue in the
title VII litigation. If the factual issues are the same, the court
should give them the proper evidentiary weight, but not a collateral
estoppel effect. Of course, the OSHA findings will have greater
weight on the issue of the availability of less discriminatory alterna-
tive practices and relatively little weight on the question whether
the business purpose of protecting the workers from the particular
health risk outweighs the discriminatory impact of the challenged
exclusionary practice.
C. The Proposal Applied
OSHA and EEOC consideration of the risks associated with
lead highlight the practical and theoretical problems posed by the
search for a way to protect the unborn from the hazards of work-
place exposure to toxins. OSHA standards for occupational ex-
posure to lead specifically take into account the effects of the pre-
natal and preconception exposure of the worker on a subsequently
born child 238 In its findings respecting the lead workplace, OSHA
stated that reproductive injury in male and female lead workers
can affect the worker's ability to conceive a normal child or to
238 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(j) (3) (c) (1980); id. app. A.
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conceive at all.23 The OSHA lead standards were challenged by
the industry in federal court and have been upheld, in substantial
and pertinent part, by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals.
240
In a separate proceeding, OSHA issued a citation against the
American Cyanamid Company, alleging that the company's estab-
lishment of surgical sterilization as a condition of employment
violated the OSH Act.241  OSHRC dismissed the citation.242  Cita-
tions brought against the employer in a separate action, which
directly related to the then existing lead standards, were upheld in
part.243 At the same time, many of the affected women employees
of American Cyanamid filed charges with the EEOC alleging sex
discrimination, and eventually filed suit in the federal court.
244
The complaint alleges that American Cyanamid's fetal protec-
tion policy violates title VII because it places a condition of em-
ployment upon otherwise fertile women-sterilization-that it does
not impose upon men.245  Under the proposal presented herein,
the court could easily dispose of the claim by finding that the prac-
tice constitutes impermissible sex-plus discrimination.246 Even given
due allowance for an employer's legitimate interest in fetal health,
there is no reason to tolerate such overt disparate treatment.
The case as presented, however, primarily represents a drafting
problem for the employer. There is no reason why American
Cyanamid or any other company in a similar position could not
formulate an exclusionary policy in sex-neutral terms, and then
apply the policy in a manner as to impact women only. In that
239 Id. app. A.
240United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1046 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
241 Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., OSHRC Docket No. 79-5762
(July 15, 1980). The employer's so-called "fetus protection policy" precluded the
employment of any women of presumed childbearing capacity in certain man-
ufacturing positions involving exposure to lead compounds. A female under age
fifty was presumed to be fertile. This presumption could be rebutted by proof of
sterilization. Id. 4-5.
2421d. The administrative law judge (ALJ) gave three reasons for dismissing
the citation. First, none of the sterilizations had occurred within the OSH Act's
statute of limitations period. Id. 6-7. Second, plaintifFs legal theory-that
sterilization constituted an impermissible "condition of employment," which violated
OSHA's general duty clause-was rejected as a misreading of the OSH Act. Id. 8.
Last, the ALJ held that the OSH Act was preempted by title VII on these facts.
Id. 11.
243 Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., OSHRC Docket No. 79-2438
(Aug. 20, 1980).
244 Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 80-0024-P (N.D. W. Va., filed
May 20, 1980).
2451 Id.
246 See notes 99-100 supra & accompanying text.
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-case, the policy survives the charge of disparate treatment on its
face but nonetheless, on the record, falls on the ground of pretext.
The recently upheld OSHA lead standards state that lead poses
,a threat to the unborn child of both male and female workers.2 4T
If the court chose to accept this administrative determination, or,
,alternatively, if it reached a similar conclusion on its own after
review of the reputable scientific evidence, then the court could find
that the employer intentionally discriminated because he excluded
only females when the threat to the unborn of male employees
was substantially similar. Furthermore, this particular employer,
American Cyanamid, had been found in violation of the OSH Act
by an OSHRC administrative law judge. Unless and until the
employer is in full compliance with the OSH Act, a presumption
of pretext should arise. Under a pretext analysis, the employer's
policy clearly falls and the plaintiffs are entitled to relief.
There is, however, the possibility that American Cyanamid
,could lower the level of lead in the workplace environment 248 to a
point at which the substance no longer posed a substantial game-
totoxic or mutagenic danger, but, acting as a teratogen, only threat-
-ened the fetus.2 49 In this case, the fetus is at risk only through the
mother, and thus the pretext argument put forth above does not
suffice to invalidate the employer's policy.
250
Of course, there may be other evidence of pretext. If, for
example, the court finds that the risks to employees of other injury
from lead such as kidney disease and respiratory or cardiovascular
impairment 251 are also substantial, then the employer's concern for
fetal health is clearly pretextual. This is unlikely to be the case,
if, by the terms of the hypothetical, the lead exposure level is re-
duced below the point at which it poses a material mutagenic or
gametotoxic danger.
In this case, assuming that the danger to fetal health is sub-
stantial, the employer policy survives unless less discriminatory
alternatives to wholesale exclusion are shown to exist. One that
immediately comes to mind is a temporary exclusion or transfer
with wage-level maintenance when the female employee learns that
she is pregnant. This may not, however, really be an alternative if
247 See notes 238-40 supra & accompanying text.
248 This could be accomplished not only by lowering the lead level in the work
environment itself, but also by periodically removing workers who intend to have
,children. See note 169 supra & accompanying text.
249 See notes 17-20 supra & accompanying text.
2 60 See note 103 supra & accompanying text.
251 See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
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the danger to the fetus is substantial in the first few weeks after
conception, as well might be the case.
In such circumstances, the only choice is to require the em-
ployer to lower the exposure levels to a point at which no signifi-
cant teratogenic harm is threatened. If this only requires, for
example, special respirators for female employees, then the court
should hold that a less discriminatory alternative is available and
hence, that the employer is in violation of title VII. If, on the
other hand, expensive capital improvements would be necessary,
a different conclusion may result-at least in the case of American
Cyanamid. Evidence in the OSHA citation hearing for American
Cyanamid's Willow Island, West Virginia plant suggested that a
"technically feasible retrofit" of the plant to substantially reduce
lead exposure levels in certain areas would cost the company about
$2.6 million.25 2  The administrative law judge adjudicating the
case held this to be economically infeasible for this employer: 23
evidence on the record showed that the lead chromate industry con-
tracted at a rate of about ten percent per year; Willow Island's
after-tax profits averaged $100,000 per year with a return-on-equity
of only one percent.254 Although the "unduly burdensome" stand-
ard posited in this Article is stricter than OSHA's feasibility test,
it may well be that, given the large capital investment necessary
relative to the low current and potential profit of the Willow
Island plant, the plant clearly represents a case in which requiring
the employer to reduce exposure levels further would be "unduly
burdensome." Only under these circumstances would the em-
ployer's discriminatory policy be justified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposal outlined in this Article is an attempt to balance
within the framework of existing law four powerful and competing
interests: worker safety, equal employment opportunity, business
profitability, and the well-being of future generations. In most
cases, the balance will be struck in favor both of health and of
equal employment opportunity; the courts should require em-
ployers to reduce the reproductive hazards associated with many
manufacturing processes rather than allow them to circumvent the
"252 Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co., OSHRC Docket No. 79-2438,
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national policy of equality of employment opportunities. Only in
the rarest instance will the interest in fetal health-and the proven
inability of the employer to follow any policy but exclusion-com-
pel the court to excuse otherwise inexcusable sex discrimination.
This result will promote the interests of working men and women-
and their unborn children-and serve to maintain the integrity of
-our developing law of equal opportunity.
